THE REAL HAPPINESS OF A PEOPLE UNDER *A Philoſophical King.*

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THE REAL HAPPINESS OF A PEOPLE UNDER *A Philosophical King*

DEMONSTRATED;

Not only from the Nature of Things, but from the undoubted Experience of the CHINESE under their first Founder FOHI, and his Illustrious Successors, HOAM TI, and XIN NUM.

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MDCCL.

TO

His Royal Highness

THE

Prince of *WALES*,

This Diſſertation is with the profoundeſt Reſpect inſcribed by

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS'S

moſt humble,

and moſt obedient Servant,

J. A. Santoroc.

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To the READER.

TO this *Diſſertation* we have added by Way of *Notes* from the other *philoſophical* Works of Mr. *Wolfius*, the *Principles* and *Definitions* he refers to in this *Diſſertation*, in order to make the whole as plain and intelligible to an Engliſh Reader as poſſible. And if the Publick ſhall think proper to favour the *Tranſlator* with their Encouragement, it is further propoſed to give in *Engliſh* the other *philoſophical* Works of this Illuſtrious Author; and in the mean Time to pave the Way for that Undertaking, to publiſh forthwith a full and diſtinct Account of Mr. *Wolfius* in the Way of *Annals* thro' the ſeveral Periods of his Life down to the preſent Time, not from uncertain Reports but from a perſonal Acquaintance with him for ſeveral Years, in which his *philoſophical* Capacity will be principally conſider'd; the great Oppoſition he met with on Account of his

Notions, and how at length he came to triumph and prevail over his moſt ſanguine Opponents. And this with the View to let the Engliſh Reader into his Character, and be no longer unacquainted with a Man, *who has by far ſurpaſſed all the Philoſophers that ever lived, in the Preciſion of his Notions, the Clearneſs and Diſtinctneſs of his Definitions, the Determinateneſs of his Propoſitions, and in that admirable Method of linking them together in one continued and indiſſoluble Chain of Reaſoning.* It would be in vain for us to pretend to add any Thing to the real Worth of this Illuſtrious *Philoſopher*, from any Thing we could ſay, when ſo many *Crowned Heads* have honoured him with *Medals* and other diſtinguiſhing Marks of their Favour, on Account of his great Deſerts, and eminent Knowledge in *Philoſophy*. And the ſeveral learned *Societies in Europe* have rival'd with each other in doing him Honour. In particular the late *Emperor Charles VI.* confer'd

confer'd on him the *Dignity* of *Baron* of the Empire. The ſeveral Learned Societies in *England*, *Ruſſia*, *France*, and *Pruſſia* did him the Honour to adopt him as one of their Members.

In writing the Life of Mr. *Wolfius* it is not my Intention to ſet up for a vain and empty *Panegyriſt* of him, guided as I am by no other Intereſt or View than the *Love of Truth*, and the doing common Juſtice to a *greatly injured Character*, and at the ſame Time reſolving to advance no one Fact without its proper Vouchers; ſo that every intelligent Reader may from the bare Recital of the Facts themſelves form to himſelf, without my pointing out to him, *the Character of this truly great Man.*

As our Author, in the *Diſſertation* we have now publiſhed, makes frequent Mention of the *practical Philoſophy of the Chineſe*, it will not be improper to obſerve here, that an Oration of his, entitled *de Sinarum Philoſophia Practica*, was what

gave Occaſion to all the Noiſe and Clamour that was raiſed againſt him. This Oration was pronounced in a ſolemn Meeting on the Anniverſary of the Foundation of the Univerſity of *Halle*, namely on the 12th of *July*, 1721, at the Time of reſigning his *Prorectorſhip*. This Speech ſo alarmed the Divines of the *Univerſity of Halle*, that without Regard to Truth or common Juſtice they faſtened on him the blackeſt Imputations and the moſt impious *Notions* poſſible; tho' he aſſerted nothing other in in it, but that the *Chineſe Manner of Philoſophy* had a great Affinity with his own. *Francke* and *Lange*, both Doctors in Divinity, and the greateſt Enemies Mr. *Wolfius* ever had, exclaim'd againſt him on this Occaſion in their publick Sermons. And the *Odium Theologicum* went ſo far, as to brand him with the Appellation of *Heathen* and *Atheiſt*; Nor was their Rancour thus ſatisfied, but they repreſented him to the late King of *Pruſſia*, as a Man the moſt dangerous

dangerous and pernicious, and ſo far their black Calumny prevailed, that the King ordered him *under Pain of immediate Death to quit the Univerſity of Halle in twenty four Hours, and His Dominions in forty-eight.*

But previous to this I ſhould have mentioned, how theſe Divines unanimouſly inſiſted, that Mr. *Wolfius* ſhould not publiſh this *Oration* without their Conſent, and without annexing their Cenſure to it. This *Wolfius* abſolutely refuſed, knowing full well their Incapacity to paſs a Judgment on Things ſo much out of their Reach.

Upon this Mr. *Wolfius* addreſſed himſelf to the *Baron Marquard Printz*, one of the moſt deſerving *Miniſters* at that Time in *Pruſſia*, telling him he was reſolved to have it printed at *Rome*, and ſubmitted to the Judgment of the *Inquiſition*. But this Deſign he laid aſide, and even that of ever publiſhing it, as it had brought upon him ſo much Trouble, and unmerited

rited ill Uſage. Yet for all this in the Year 1722, it was printed at *Rome* with the Cenſure and Approbation of the *Holy Office of the Inquiſition*. And in the Year 1725, this Edition was reprinted at *Trevoux*, with the Cenſure of the *Jeſuits*: Both theſe Editions being without the *Author's Privity*, or Participation, he never owned, and eſpecially as a great Number of Faults were crept into them.

The genuine Edition then is that he himſelf publiſhed ſome Time after that of *Trevoux* in 1725, which was inſerted in the *Acta Eruditorum of Leipſick* p. 794. A full Recenſion of, and a Critick on this Oration you may find in the *Act: Erud: Lipſ:* for the Month of May 1726, and in the *Journal des Sçavans*, and in the *Hiſtoire Literaire de l'Europe*.

To conclude, I muſt acquaint the Reader that the Reverend Mr. *des Champs* Miniſter of the *Savoy* here in London, did in the Year 1740, tranſlate into *French* this ſame *Treatiſe*,

Treatiſe, when he was *Tutor* to the young Princes of *Pruſſia*, and dedicated it to his preſent Majeſty the King of *Pruſſia*. It being my Intention to give the Reader a general Idea of all the Works which Mr. *Wolfius* has publiſhed, I thought it very proper in the mean Time to add at the End of the preſent *Diſſertation* a ſhort *Abſtract* of them by Mr. *des Champs*, which may ſerve to give the Reader a Taſte of Mr. *Wolfius's Philoſophy* and prepare him for our intended Publication of his Works at large, ſhould the Publick think proper to encourage ſuch a Deſign.

CORRIGENDA.

P. 6. lin. 17. *for* be ſome, *r.* become
P. 43. l. 6. *for* ro, *r.* to
P. 66. l. 11, 12. *for* added, *r.* placed
P. 67. l. 14. *r.* carrying on
P. 70. l. 12. *r.* Philoſopher,
P. 84. l. 11. *for* greater, *r.* great
P. 87. l. 18. *r.* preceeding

§ 1. *The Author's Deſign.*

THE Saying of *Plato* is well known, *that then it is a Community will be happy, when either Philoſophers rule, or they that rule are Philoſophers:* This evidently appears, not only in Speculation, but in Fact and Experience. I have in another Place hinted (*a*), that the ancient Emperors and Kings of *China* were Men of a *philoſophical Turn*; among whom I mentioned FOHI, the Founder of the Sciences and Empire among the *Chineſe*, and his immediate Succeſſors. And to their Care it is owing, that their Form of Government is of all others the beſt, and that as in Antiquity, ſo in the Art of governing, this Nation has ever ſurpaſſed all others without Exception. But here I chuſe not to repeat, what the Reader may find there. Tho' from the Inſtance of the

(*a*) In Oratione de Sinarum Philoſophia practica, *p.* 6.

Chineſe, the Truth of the above Aſſertion abundantly appears, yet we imagine it will not be improper, to throw the Light of our *philoſophical Principles* upon an Aſſertion, duely underſtood but by very few.

§ 2. *When a People may be ſaid to be happy?*

WHAT we are then to demonſtrate *a priori* (1.) from the Principles of our Philoſophy, *is that a Community will then be happy, when either Philoſophers rule, or the Rulers are Philoſophers.* We therefore deem it not a Thing foreign to our Purpoſe, in the firſt Place, to explain, when

(1.) *A priori.* Demonſtration conſiſts in a Series of Syllogiſm's, generally called Arguments, whoſe Propoſitions are of certain and undoubted Truth. The Propoſitions are taken from the Nature of the Subject itſelf, from its Definition, from Axioms, and other Propoſitions previouſly demonſtrated, which have a Relation to it. This is what we call *Demonſtration a priori*; or Demonſtration is founded upon Obſervations, and Experience, which put Men upon Inquiry into the Subject, and then it is what we commonly call *a Demonſtration a Poſteriori.* In this Manner Mr. *Wolfius* demonſtrates *a priori*, the Truth of *Plato*'s *Saying*; as for Inſtance from the Nature of publick Happineſs, the Uſefulneſs of Philoſophy to procure this Happineſs, the Example of FOHI, and of the firſt Founders of the *Chineſe* Government ſerving him for *a Demonſtration a Poſteriori.*

a People

a People may be ſaid to be happy, that we may not ſeem to our Readers to talk of an Utopian or imaginary State of Happineſs (*b*). It muſt readily be granted, that Men came together to form a Society, with no other View but to be in a Condition with joint Powers to promote a common Good, and to defend themſelves againſt any Aſſaults of an Enemy. Whence, ſeeing human Happineſs conſiſts in one uninterrupted Progreſs towards greater Degrees of Perfection, the Happineſs of Society, which is a certain Number of Men promoting with united Force a common Good, ſhould conſiſt in being undiſturbed in attaining the End, for which they formed themſelves into a Society. That People therefore may be deemed happy, which with joint Force may promote the common Good, and upon Occaſion repel a common Enemy. What the Things requiſite to the common Good are, we have taught in our political Philoſophy. It ſufficeth here briefly to hint, *that the common Good compriſes the higheſt*

(*b*) Campanella in Appendice politicæ, quæ in ejuſdem Reali Philoſophia Epilogiſtica continetur, a Tobia Adami Francof. 1623 edita.

Good, which every Individual can attain to in this World, according to the different State he is in. But to make a large Conceſſion, let us wave every Diſpute about the Nature of civil Happineſs, and ſimply ſuppoſe it is obtained, if the *End*, for which Men came to aſſociate be obtained, for in this we muſt all agree, that there is ſome *End* a *Society* as ſuch, has in View, and that to this every Thing muſt be directed, which concerns the *Society*; and that a Society is no longer happy than in ſo far as all Things regarding it, have a Tendency to this *End*. Tho' it may ſeem too general, yet for our preſent Purpoſe this Principle is ſufficient, thence to deduce *the Connection of civil Happineſs with the Government of a Philoſopher*. It is not our Deſign to ſhew in every Particular, the Uſefulneſs and Neceſſity of *Philoſophy* for obtaining the particular Ends of *Society*; at preſent we ſhall reſt in Generals, which will abundantly evince *the Thing to be proved*, and be eaſily applicable to particular Caſes, when for the Sake of greater Perſpicuity it is thought neceſſary to deſcend to ſuch.

And

And that this may be done, we will in what follows give Samples, which will plainly ſhew the Application of the general Principles to the particular Caſes. This then is what we are to prove, *that if Kings or Rulers are Philoſophers, or Philoſophers Kings, then it is that the End of Society is obtained*, and the whole Care of the Ruler, and his every Effort has a Tendency to it; whereas from a different Conduct many Things run counter to and contradict this End, and from theſe again a Train of others ariſes, which proves inconſiſtent with the civil Happineſs of a People. And hence thoſe continual Complaints, which are not entirely without Foundation.

§ 3. *The Endowments of Mind requiſite for governing.*

IF now it ſhould be asked what Qualifications are requiſite in a Ruler, to make a People happy? the Anſwer is eaſy; namely, he muſt be one capable of underſtanding the Things requiſite to render a People

People happy, and have a firm Reſolution of executing with Fidelity, what he thus knows to be conducive to ſo noble an End. § 241. *Polit.*

This doubtleſs will be readily granted, and might be aſſumed without Proof. Can it in the leaſt be doubted that he who is obliged to act any Part, is obliged to underſtand that Part, and have a firm Purpoſe of acting up to it? A Thing ſo conſonant to our *common Notions* no wiſe Man can well call in Queſtion, and therefore it is evident that in a Ruler *certain intellectual and moral Endowments* (2) muſt be preſuppoſed, which, with Reſpect to their End, he in a particular Manner has made his own, ſo as to be ſome *Royal*, not vulgar *Endowments*; to underſtand this, an Inſtance is neceſſary. In the Number of *intellectual Virtues* we reckon *Wiſdom* as one. Now as this Virtue is intirely converſant about the Ends to be preſcribed to

(2) *The intellectual Endowments*, are the Capacity or the Diſpoſitions of the Mind or Underſtanding, to know Truth: *The moral Endowments*, are the Diſpoſitions of the Will to practice Virtue; as may be ſeen by the Examples alledged by Mr. *Wolfius*.

our

our Actions, and the Choice of the Means leading to theſe Ends, and about ſuch a Subordination of particular Ends, that the Proximate may be the Means of the more remote, ſo every one muſt ſtand in Need of *Wiſdom* for the Management of his Affairs; but as Buſineſs is various, ſo muſt the *Wiſdom* to conduct it, be as various too.

Wherefore, ſince a Ruler has Affairs peculiar to himſelf, to manage theſe to Advantage, he has Need of a peculiar Sort, which is a *Royal*, and therefore a *peculiar Wiſdom*: Whence it is, when we come in general to treat of *Wiſdom*, among the *intellectual Virtues* in Morality, and to preſcribe the Means of attaining each Virtue in particular, we conſider the general *Wiſdom* of Mankind, as it may be extended to each particular Caſe in Life: And with Advantage we then come to treat of the *Wiſdom* of Rulers in the Doctrine of *political Philoſophy* amongſt the other *Royal Virtues*, when we are inſtructed in each Particular, which civil Happineſs requires for the due Adminiſtration of Government. This Diſtinction the Ancients themſelves made,

made, boldly pronouncing, *no one capable of claiming to Wiſdom in every Thing.* It therefore ſufficeth an Individual to be *wiſe* in theſe Things, which are within his proper Province to manage: Nor is it to be apprehended, that thereby *Wiſdom* is confined to too narrow Limits; *that Wiſdom* is ſufficiently ample, tho' converſant about a few Things, if diffuſed thro' the whole Extent of theſe Things; nor is the *Royal Wiſdom* from the Number and Extent of its Affairs to be deemed too limited and confined. The ſame Thing alſo holds of all the other Virtues adorning a Ruler.

'Tis the ſame Thing as to all the other Virtues which adorn a Prince, as I ſhall plainly ſhew in its proper Place in my political Philoſophy. For there is no Occaſion here to engage in a particular Detail on the Nature of the Royal Virtues, both intellectual and moral; in a general Treatment of them, which is all we here intend, it ſufficeth to point at their Principles, as being all that was needful to demonſtrate what we here propoſed.

§ 4. *When*

§ 4. *When and why a Ruler may be in Fault.*

WE have ſaid that a Ruler ſhould upon every Emergency both underſtand and chuſe the Things requiſite for, and certainly conducive to the publick Safety and Tranquillity. And hence it appears, that if a Ruler happened to be guilty of any Miſconduct inconſiſtent either with the publick Safety or Tranquillity, conſequently with civil Happineſs, it is either thro' Ignorance, or from other extrinſick Reaſons, that he ſuffers himſelf to be hurried away by the Violence of his Paſſions: namely, the Fault is either in his Underſtanding or in his Will. If therefore in the Adminiſtration of Government, a Ruler would not depart from the Path of publick Happineſs, he muſt needs remedy both theſe Imperfections; and if no other Remedy be more effectual than *Philoſophy*, it muſt be owned, that to render a People happy, either *a King muſt be a Philoſopher*,

or a Philoſopher a King. It is our Buſineſs then more diſtinctly to explain, why a Ruler, either thro' Ignorance, or Miſtake, or Violence of Paſſion, may come to fail in Duty, and at the ſame Time ſhew, how *Philoſophy* may contribute to rectify both his Head and his Heart.

§ 5. *Who the Philoſopher is, and who may be ſaid to reaſon philoſophically?*

BUT before we can plainly ſhew, the Help *Philoſophy* affords in order to rule well, we muſt point out who the *Philoſopher* is, not in Name, but Reality ſuch. He then deſerves that diſtinguiſhing Appellation, *who can aſſign a Reaſon for Things that either actually exiſt, or are only poſſible*; and ſuch a one I pronounce capable, who both does himſelf underſtand and can explain to others, why Things poſſible attain to actual Exiſtence, and in a given Caſe why one poſſible does ſo in Preference to another, which was equally

equally poſſible with it. He therefore reaſons *philoſophically*, *who aſſigns a Reaſon of thoſe Things he obſerves to happen, and can inſtruct others, why theſe Things happen rather than others, and how?* For ſince the Number of Things poſſible is infinite, no one Man can pretend to be a *Philoſopher* in all. It ſufficeth therefore that we reaſon *philoſophically* about thoſe Things which are properly within our own *Province.* A Ruler therefore is obliged to reaſon *philoſophically* about the publick Safety and Tranquillity, or the Things regarding good Government, as that is his Care and Concern principally; from but a ſlight View of civil or political Philoſophy, we may obſerve in ſeveral Inſtances, that we can not reaſon philoſophically on good Government in all its Extent, without ſometimes having Recourſe to the other *Diſciplines or Sciences*, from thence to take, and borrow our Principles: A Thing not to be wondered at, as all the Truths, diſperſed thro' the ſeveral Sciences, have a cloſe Connexion with each other. Beſides, a Ruler ſhould enure himſelf to

reaſon about ſome Things, in order to qualify him to reaſon properly about others, which more nearly regard good Government. Now, in order to reaſon well, certain Habits of Mind are requiſite, which are to be gained only by the Uſe or Exerciſe of our Faculties. And they are acquired generally with more Eaſe in other Kinds of Truths than in thoſe, whoſe Knowledge is requiſite for managing Buſineſs. And hence you may obſerve the ancient *Chineſe* Emperors, who were *Philoſophers* too, not only reaſoning about good Government, but exerciſing their Genius on other Subjects, to enable them to get an Inſight into the abſtruſer Parts of good Government, which may eaſily eſcape even a good Penetration. Thus Fohi the Founder of the *Chineſe* Nation, from the Contemplation of the Heavens, and of ſublunary Things, framed a Table of ſixty-four Figures, which is uſually called Ye Kim, or *the Book of Mutations*, and greatly exerciſes the *Chineſe* Wits at this Day to underſtand it, the Key being now loſt. *Confucius*, who employed much

Labour

Labour in explaining it, and who is thought to have ſucceeded beſt therein, contends, that from the natural Connexion of Things, their Order, their Viciſſitudes and Powers of acting, the moſt excellent Inſtructions may be derived for regulating both the perſonal and domeſtic Life, and chiefly the publick Government of Towns, Provinces, and of a whole Empire (*g*). The ſame FOHI invented *Muſical Inſtruments*, employing himſelf much in the Buſineſs of *Invention*, and applying his Powers to the Contemplation of *Nature*, to gain the greater Degree of Penetration, in order to qualify him to frame, and model a *Common Wealth*. His Succeſſor in Empire XIN NUM, applied himſelf no leſs uſefully to the Invention of Inſtruments neceſſary in *Agriculture*, and to inquire into the *medicinal Virtues of Plants*. He trod in the Steps of his Predeceſſor, with the View the better to gain a greater Inſight into thoſe Things, which are ſerviceable for bringing to Perfection a Republick already formed.

(*g*) Vid. Couplet in proemiali Declaratione, Confucio præmiſſa, *f.* 44, 45.

His

His Succeſſor again HOAM TI, under whom the Splendor of the *Chineſe* Empire took its Riſe, compleated the *Sexagenary Cycle*, which at this Day the *Chineſe* ſtill uſe in reckoning their Years; he ſet about forming Aſtronomy into a Science; he framed a Kind of Arithmetical Table or *Abacus*; he was the Inventor of Muſical Inſtruments, Arms, Nets, Chariots, Smithery and Pottery, Meaſures and Weights; and in ſeveral Treatiſes he explained the phyſical Doctrine of Pulſes, which at this Day is in Uſe among the *Chineſe*. HOAM TI therefore employed himſelf in the Buſineſs of Invention, and applied himſelf to the Study of *Art* and *Nature*, in order to qualify him for compleating the *Chineſe* Form of Government (*b*). And let no one preſume to judge contemptuouſly of the *Chineſe Emperors*, as if their Form of Government would loſe in the Compariſon with that of other *Kings* and *Princes* in the World. 'Tis a Thing well known that the Empire of *China* is of a vaſt Ex-

(*b*) Vid. Couplet in Chronol. Sin. *fol.* 20. *Pref.* et *f.* 1, 2. Tab. Chronol.

tent,

tent, divided into fifteen very large Provinces, each of which are unanimouſly agreed by all Travellers into *China*, to deſerve the Name of large Kingdoms rather than Provinces.

The three firſt Emperors, Fohi, Xin Num, and Hoam Ti, ſettled that Model of Government, wherein it now excels all other Models in the World, and which has for ſo many thouſand Years back flouriſhed, and ſtill continues to flouriſh at this Day, whilſt other *Monarchies* and *Kingdoms* have had their final Period and Diſſolution. Their laſt Founder Hoam Ti began to reign in the Year MMDCLXXXXVII. *before Chriſt.* Should it be objected that a Ruler, can not poſſibly be ſuppoſed Maſter of the Time and Opportunity requiſite for the Buſineſs of Invention, and of philoſophical Reaſonings, without neglecting the Affairs of a vaſt Empire; the Example of theſe great Men, who never ſuffered themſelves to fail in any Thing, that ſeemed to have the leaſt Relation to the Buſineſs of Rulers, is a ſufficient Refutation. Neither was it poſſible for them

other-

otherwiſe than from their own Experience, to frame a Model of Government, which exceeds all others, that have hitherto appeared in the World.

§ 6. *The Neceſſity of Philiſophy for perfecting a Commonwealth already formed.*

THESE Things premiſed about the Happineſs of a People, the Endowments of Rulers, and the proper Notion of *Philoſophy*, it will be no difficult Matter to ſhew, what Aſſiſtance *Rulers* may expect from *Philoſophy* for the promoting of civil or political Happineſs. What we have to ſay here is reducible to two Heads; namely, that a *Ruler*, if a *Philoſopher*, will with more Certainty underſtand what Things are requiſite for good Government, and ever chuſe what ſerves to promote the Happineſs of a People. If Rulers would conſtitute a Form of Government, or perfect what is already conſtituted, they muſt needs be Men of a philoſophical Turn, eſpecially

eſpecially where they have not other Models of Government to copy after. This is the Caſe of the *Chineſe*, among whom *Kings* were *Philoſophers*, and *Philoſophers Kings*, as we hinted above, § 5. For at the Time FOHI came to command ſo vaſt an Empire, its Form remained to be conſtituted, nor was he acquainted with any other Form of Government, after which to copy, as the *Chineſe* had no Commerce with other Nations, being entire Strangers to what paſſed without the Limits of their own Empire, as the Reſt of the World were Strangers to them. But when XIN NUM, and HOAM TI, were advanced to that Dignity, the Form ſettled by FOHI muſt needs want to be carried on to a greater Degree of Perfection. They therefore from the End they propoſed to themſelves, could not fail to deviſe the Means proper for gaining that End. For the finding out the Means, a *diſtinct Notion* of the End, and of ſome general Principles was neceſſary. For by a Train of reaſoning they muſt arrive at the Knowledge of what was proper to be done; as no one but

muſt know, that Ratiocination requires a Number of Judgments, from which as *Premiſſes* a third Judgment, called the *Concluſion*, may be gathered. Now Judgments, formed from the diſtinct Notion of the End, afford only one *Premiſs*, namely the *Minor* of a *Syllogiſm*, in the *Language* of *Logicians*. Other more general Principles were therefore neceſſary to form the major Propoſition, before ever the *Concluſion* (3) could be fairly inferred. In like Manner it is evident that to continue a Chain of Reaſonings, general Principles

(3) *Concluſion*; A *Syllogiſm in Form* is nothing elſe but an *Argument*, or *Diſcourſe* accurately concluſive, conſiſting of three Propoſitions, whereof the two former are called by Logicians, the firſt the *Major*, the ſecond the *Minor*, and both together the *Premiſſes*, and the third the *Concluſion*. How odd ſoever it may appear to thoſe, who have no *Idea* at all of *Logic*, or of the Manner of forming an exact Diſcourſe, yet the Syllogiſtic Method is the ſhorteſt, and beſt Way to diſcover *Truth* from *Falſity* in every Propoſition where there is the leaſt Poſſibility of proving it, when reduced to a Syllogiſm in Form, conſequently that every other Propoſition not reducible to ſuch a Form, includes neceſſarily an Error, excepting, however, ſuch a one as is ſelf evident. The following Example, tho' a very common one, will notwithſtanding be very proper to ſhew in what Manner a true Propoſition includes a *Syllogiſm*. A Peaſant preſents his Son with a Swallow, and in ſhort, tells him it is a Bird. Why a Bird? becauſe it has Wings and can fly. This Reaſon you ſee naturally includes

Principles are requiſite, as it is very rare that we infer from one ſingle *Syllogiſm* the Thing we propoſe to find out. And let no one imagine, we here abſurdly appeal to the Buſineſs of *Syllogiſms*, in a Diſcourſe on the important Meditations, which em-

cludes this Principle, that every Thing that has Wings, and can fly, is a Bird; and it alſo appears that the Peaſant's Diſcourſe contains the following *Syllogiſm* in Form.

Major. Every winged and flying Creature is a Bird.
Minor. The Swallow is a winged and flying Creature.
Concluſion. Therefore, the Swallow is a Bird.

Mr. *Wolfius* has taken a great deal of Pains accurately to explain every Thing relating to the Buſineſs of Syllogiſms, and to recommend their Uſefulneſs, not only in his *Latin* Logic, but alſo in his *German*, which the Rev. Mr. *des Champs* has tranſlated into *French*. Several of Mr. *Wolfius* Thoughts in Relation to Syllogiſm may not here be improperly added. Ch. 4. § 22. " I have," ſays he, " like a great many others, " had the utmoſt Averſion and Contempt for regular Syllo- " giſm; but upon maturer Reflection, became apprized that " the Caſe was quite different from what I imagined it to be: " And from that Time I made not the leaſt Scruple to give " into the ſame Opinion with a great many other learned " Men, out of a Love to Truth, and to do Juſtice to what ſo " many ſuperficial Minds conſidered as empty Puerilities and " mere Trifles." § 27. of the ſame Chap. he continues to ſhew us the Method of making Uſe of Syllogiſms.

" Tho' I have inſiſted," ſays he, " upon the Uſefulneſs " of Syllogiſms, it is not my Meaning that one muſt uſe " them in Form upon all Occaſions: this would be quite ri- " diculous, and pedantick. It will be enough to expreſs only " the Concluſion when deduced according to Rules; omitting " the Premiſſes, when it is eaſy to remember them, as being " connected with the general Diſcourſe or Argument." See Log. Lat. § 551. et ſeq.

ploy the Thoughts of *Rulers* on Affairs the moſt arduous, and weighty. For I have *elſewhere ſhewn* (4) that all Kinds of Meditation, that is, any Series or Train of Thoughts carried on by Means of the Operations of the Mind, are diſtinctly explicable by formal *Syllogiſms*; juſt as the Walk or Gait of a Man is by *ſtatical* and *mechanical Laws* ‡. And as *Emperors*, *Kings*, and *Princes* walk by no other Laws nor move their Feet and Joints in no other Manner, than other Men do, ſo neither have they different Laws of thinking from the Reſt of the World. But a Philoſopher ſhould never fail to uſe the received Terms, if he would be underſtood, in

(4) *Elſewhere ſhewn*, namely, in Pſychologia Empirica, § 393, 394. *Pſychologia* is that Part of Metaphyſicks which contains the Doctrine of the Soul. Mr. *Wolfius* divides this Doctrine into two Parts. The firſt he calls *Pſychologia Empirica*, or *Experimentalis*; wherein he argues *a Poſteriori*, in explaining the Facts relating to the Soul, and its Operations which are known to us. Then follows *Pſychologia Rationalis*, or *Demonſtrativa*, grounded upon the Ideas we have of the Soul, and upon the Definitions of its Operations: and every Thing relating to it he eſtabliſhes upon ſteady and ſolid Foundations.

‡ *Statical and Mechanical Laws*, Mechanicks, is the Doctrine of Motion: Staticks, the Doctrine of the Equilibrium of ſolid Bodies.

in any Thing he is engaged to explain with Diſtinctneſs and Preciſion, nor do trite and vulgar Terms detract any Thing from the Dignity of the Subject they are deſtined to explain. Now *determinate and univerſal Notions* (5), which anſwer to Propoſitions which are uſeful for the Purpoſes of diſtinct Ratiocination, are properly *philoſophical* (*l*). The *Chineſe* Emperors therefore, the Founders of the Empire were furniſhed with a Stock of *Philoſophy*, and by its Means they modelled their *Government*; and not having any Model of Government to copy after, nor any compleat Syſtem of *civil* or *political Philoſophy* to

(5) *Determinate and univerſal Notions.* Univerſal Ideas are ſuch, as can be applied to ſeveral different *Species*, or ſeveral *Individuals*; generally they ſerve as the *Major Propoſitions of Syllogiſms.* For Example, this is the Idea we form to ourſelves of an *Animal*, under which we comprehend both *Man* and *Brute*; ſeparately we form to ourſelves an Idea of them both when we conſider them, *Man* and *Brute*, in Relation to their *Individuals.* A *determinate* Idea, is that, which contains, neither more nor fewer Signs, than are requiſite exactly to repreſent or explain an Object. He who is capable of diſtinguiſhing theſe Signs, and deſcribing them in proper Terms, has a *determinate Idea* of them, which Idea is nothing elſe but a diſtinct one, expreſſed in proper and accurate Terms. Theſe Terms are what ſettle or fix the Ideas, and communicate them to others, when once the Ideas themſelves are determined.

(*l*) Vid. Hor. Subſec. A. 1729. Trim. Brum. n. 1. § 16.

to apply, they were by Dint of Genius carried to the *Principle of Reduction* (6) promiſcuouſly familiar to all Inventors. For as they had, and not unhappily, reduced the Direction or Conduct of a Family or Houſe to Self-Direction, arguing by Virtue of a determinate Similitude from Self-Direction, or the Conduct of one's own Perſon or Body to the Management of a Family; ſo at length they came to reduce the Notion of a *Commonwealth* to that of a Houſe or Family, and under the Perſon of the Head of the Family repreſented to them-

(6) *Principle of Reduction*, Principium Reductionis, is an Inference from one Caſe to another Analogous thereto. Such a particular Thing has proved to be of good Effect in ſuch and ſuch Circumſtances; Conſequently it may be uſed in the preſent Caſe, which has a Similitude of Circumſtances with it. A great Degree of Skill is required when one would apply this Principle to the ſeveral Events both of the civil and moral Life; becauſe Caſes do not reſemble one another with the ſame Exactneſs, as the Individuals of the ſelf-ſame Species; and where the leaſt Circumſtance may alter them ſo that we may come quite to fail in the Uſe of this Principle. This following Example may ſerve to illuſtrate what we have juſt now advanced. A Man who may prove to be a very good Officer at the Head of a Regiment, or Detachment, will very often prove not to be the ſame Man, when at the Head of an Army; the Reaſon is, becauſe the very ſame Motions and Exerciſes he put his Regiment or Detachment upon, he applies to the whole Body of an Army, whoſe Operations often prove quite different from thoſe Motions he ſeparately performed with his own Regiment or Detachment.

themſelves a Ruler, or Governor, thus arguing again by Virtue of a determinate Similitude from a Family to a civil Society. Nor are we to imagine, that the Empire of *China* was conſtituted, and compleated in its Form by any premature or precipitate Meaſures. Before ever they thought of ſo arduous an Affair, they firſt applied themſelves duly to form their own Conduct and Actions, to ſhew, how one muſt order and regulate himſelf, eſpecially his own Body. Then they imaged to themſelves a Family under the Figure of a Body, and the Head of the Family under that of the Soul, and by Virtue of this Analogy they gathered, whatever Light was requiſite to govern and manage a Houſe. From this, by leiſurely Steps, they proceeded further; but what they underſtood about the Management of a Family, they took Care to put in Practice, before ever they attempted any other Thing of a more arduous Nature, in order to be thoroughly acquainted with it, and fully perſuaded of its Truth, and further to improve it, and make new Acceſſions to it.

When

When they had now experienced the happy Succeſs of their Meaſures in governing a Family; they at length figured to themſelves a Province or Kingdom under the Notion of a Family, and the King as the Head of that Family; nay, at length they imaged to themſelves a whole Empire, conſiſting of ſeveral Kingdoms under the ſame Figure, and by Virtue of this *Analogy* formed Notions to themſelves of good Government. Nor did they admit theſe Things as beyond all Exception, till they had confirmed and eſtabliſhed them by their own Experience. FOHI having his Mind repleniſhed with theſe truly venerable and auguſt Notions, which had been diſcovered by the Penetration of many, and confirmed by a long Uſe and Practice of the World, did with no vain Effort undertake ſo arduous a Task, as was the determining and ſettling the laſting Form of ſo extenſive an Empire. Yet he himſelf did not entirely compleat the Affair, as he abſolutely determined nothing but what in his daily Courſe of Governing he found confirmed by a Number of Experiences.

And

And hence it was that he named his Succeſſor, and aſſumed him to a Partnerſhip of the Empire, that he might be well aſſured of his Abilities for the Task of compleating what he himſelf had ſo happily begun. The Succeſſors of FOHI added therefore every Thing which he had not yet ventured to conſtitute and appoint, and that nothing might be precipitately ſettled, they proceeded in the ſame Path which he had ſo happily trodden before them. And thus only after a Courſe of ſome Ages was effected what FOHI himſelf could not wholly finiſh and compleat. Hence doubtleſs, will abundantly appear the great Difference between *thoſe* who reaſon *philoſophically* in determining the Form of a Commonwealth, and *thoſe* who are *Empiricks* in the Buſineſs, ſervilely imitating what they have obſerved in other Places. And I imagine there will be none to call in Queſtion, that it very much conduces to the well conſtituting a Commonwealth, and duly compleating its Form, *if the Founders be Philoſophers, or Philoſophers the Founders.* Who they are that reaſon duly and philo-

ſophically in ſo important an Affair, the Inſtance of the *Chineſe* abundantly evinces. But if you want a Demonſtration, here it follows. If a Commonwealth is to be well conſtituted, ſuch ſhould be its Form, as to be fitted to promote with united Force the common Good, and maintain itſelf againſt every hoſtile Attack upon it, § 2. We ought therefore to be clear as to the Means, by which this End may be obtained, for here ought to lie the Care and Attention of the Founder, how theſe Means may be put to Execution. For theſe Means may be diſcovered and made out either *a Poſteriori*, ſo far as others have practiſed them not unſucceſsfully before, or from the Notion of the End. In both Caſes our Notions muſt be reduced to *determinate Propoſitions* (7), which by a certain Chain of reaſoning we may apply, and in applying, not ſwerve from the Truth. It there-

(7) *Determinate Propoſitions.* Having explained, N° 5. what I mean by a determinate Propoſition, it will be enough to mention, that thoſe combined Ideas produce determinate Ideas, that is, that they have neither more nor fewer Words than are requiſite to explain a determinate Judgment, to which they have a Relation.

fore

fore appears, that if one would conſtitute a Commonwealth well, he muſt needs be a Philoſopher, and reaſon philoſophically about its Conſtitution, unleſs he would hazard a doubtful Event by copying after other Models that might chance to offer to him.

§ 7. *The Neceſſity and Utility of Philoſophy in the Buſineſs of governing.*

IN much the ſame Manner are ſhewn both the abſolute Neceſſity and great Uſefulneſs of Philoſophy in order to govern. For he, that would govern, ought in nothing to allow himſelf to act arbitrarily, and at Pleaſure, with Reſpect to the Concerns of the Community, but hold this as the ſupreme Law in every Thing, to act in a Subſerviency to the promoting the common Good, and preſerving the publick Security and Peace, § 215. *Polit.*

He who uſes the Perſpective of Philoſophy, will eaſily ſee that this Law can

not exactly be obſerved without the Advantage of a philoſophick Penetration, and a deep Tincture of philoſophical Notions. For the *diſcurſive* Judgment muſt determine about what ought to be done in every Emergency, which is evidently not eſtabliſhed by a bare Attention to the preſent Caſe; but gathered from it by Virtue of a Ratiocination: For no one can perſuade himſelf that the very Idea of the particular Caſe contains what the End of Government, civil Happineſs, directs to be done. To underſtand therefore, what ought to be done, we muſt in the firſt Place duly determine about the particular Caſe from thoſe Circumſtances, which come to claim our Regard from the Intention of the End. For it is neceſſary to be well verſed in the Skill of forming diſtinct Notions by a Courſe of Reflection, leaſt ſome Circumſtances of the preſent Caſe ſhould eſcape our Attention, and alſo that we may accurately determine the Circumſtances themſelves, as they appear in the preſent Caſe, leaſt, by confuſed Preceptions they be miſtaken for others, from

which

which they differ. And if we ought to ſeparate theſe Circumſtances from each other, ſome of which are determined by other Circumſtances, ſo that ſome others being ſuppoſed, theſe very Circumſtances themſelves are ſuppoſed too: But others again not mutually determined by each other, ſo that ſome being ſuppoſed, the Reſt are not ſuppoſed too, only they may co-exiſt; either what may be the Caſe here ought previouſly to appear, or ought to be made out by Demonſtration. And if what ſhould be determined about the Circumſtances of the preſent Caſe, ought previouſly to appear, or be evident, we ſhould be well acquainted with the Caſe itſelf, ſo far as we either have a certain Experience or a ſpeculative Knowledge of it. There is a Degree of Penetration requiſite, which in vain is to be looked for in one who is no Philoſopher, for forming *diſtinct Notions* (8) by Means of Reflection, for

(8) *Diſtinct Notions*, or Ideas, according to the Definition of Mr. *Wolfius*, are thoſe in which we can diſtinguiſh the Marks or Signs of the Objects they repreſent, whilſt *clear Ideas* have no other Effect but to repreſent an Object in general with other Objects,

for diſtinguiſhing Circumſtances, which are mutually determinable, or which may only co-exiſt, and for *determining* properly in every emergent Caſe. And after having duly *determined* the Caſe, ſome certain Principle is neceſſary, by Virtue of which we may come to learn, what ought to be done in that Caſe, that we may not ſeem to act contrary to the publick Safety, Security and Peace. To this Principle anſwers a *determinate* Notion, and therefore the Propoſition ſhould be *determinate*, accurately to expreſs what ought to be done in that Caſe. Now *determinate* Propoſitions,

Objects, without being able to tell, how, and wherein we diſtinguiſh it. For Example, I have ſeen a *Triangle*, and contemplated it ſo much that for the future I can diſtinguiſh it from every other Figure whatſoever; then it is I have a *clear Idea* of it. But when I know not, whether it be *regular* or *irregular*, nor in what it differs from other Figures, and what thoſe Marks are by which I may know it again; tho' I have a *clear*, yet I have not a *diſtinct Idea* of it. Our Ideas or Notions of Senſation are very clear; we preſently know one Colour from another, one Taſte from another; but what properly Red, and Green, Bitter and Sweet are, we have nothing to diſtinguiſh, no Characteriſtick Mark at all by which we can expreſs their Diſtinction. The Doctrine of Notions being one of the principal Parts of Logic, Mr. *Wolfius* has been at a great deal of Pains, to diſtinguiſh well, and unravel their different Kinds. So that beſides him, and Mr. *Reinbeck*, in his Treatiſe on the Immortality of the rational Soul, no other has ſucceeded ſo well in clearing up this Subject.

tions, whether *a Poſteriori* or *a Priori*, are all of them philoſophical. That you may therefore with a Certainty of Judgment attain to what ought to be done in any given Caſe, *Philoſophy* is neceſſary. And thus appears the indiſpenſable Neceſſity of *Philoſophy* no leſs in governing then in forming a Commonwealth. The *Chineſe* are a freſh Inſtance, who, as I have in another Place explained it, frame their *Annals* in a very peculiar Manner, as that from the reading them one may gain a certain Knowledge of all Tranſactions and Events, and the Mind of the aſſiduous Reader be tinctured with the *philoſophical Notions* we have taught as requiſite for governing; and therefore theſe *Annals* are reckoned among the *claſſical Books* of the Wiſe, or thoſe who would aſſume the Honour of being *Philoſophers*; and *Confucius*, to make himſelf Maſter of *practical Philoſophy*, which always engaged the chief Attention of the *Chineſe*, as they directed all their Studies to the Buſineſs of good Government, as their ultimate View, was from his fifteenth Year a cloſe Reader of

theſe *Annals*, bringing every Thing back to his own Experience in that Order, which we above taught, the *Founders of the Empire* uſed in diſcovering them, § 6. in order to render his Notions *determinate*, to aſſure himſelf of being Maſter of them, and not to fail in his Reaſonings about Affairs of real Life. Again, the *Chineſe* had a Cuſtom, as appears from the Works of *Confucius* and *Memcius*, in Things of an arduous Nature to conſult the *Philoſophers*, who were of the Council of the *petty Princes*, and of the *Emperor* himſelf, when in any Caſe at a Loſs about what was proper to be done. For the *Philoſophers* excelled, and far ſurpaſſed all others in *political Knowledge*. We omit other things, which might ſerve to ſhew, that the *Chineſe* acknowledged the Utility, nay indiſpenſable Neceſſity of *Philoſophy* in order to govern well, and that they made no unſucceſsful Uſe of it. The Reaſon of our appealing to Example is, that we may not ſeem to deliver Things repugnant to Experience (9) and entirely chimerical and ideal.

(9) *Experience*, or *Theory*, to be underſtood, the latter as *a Priori*, the former as *a Poſteriori*. See N° 1.

§ 8. *Some*

§ 8. *Some Things to be noted about the Chineſe Manner of Reaſoning philoſophically on Government.*

BEFORE we proceed any further, we muſt drop a few Hints about the Example of the *Chineſe*, to which we appealed, when about to ſhew the Utility and even indiſpenſable Neceſſity of Philoſophy for forming and governing a Common-Wealth. And let no one take it into his Head, as if we were of the Opinion, that the *Chineſe*, both in Conſtituting and Governing their Common Wealth, made Uſe of *Philoſophy* in all its Extent, the very Thing *Plato* builds *political Happineſs* upon: For tho' their Conduct was excellent, ſo as to afford a juſt ground of Doubt, whether a more illuſtrious Example can any where be found: Yet their Example is ſtill very ſhort of that Perfection, which we ſhould attentively eye, to be thoroughly appriſed of the Connexion of Civil Happineſs with

the Government of a *Philoſopher*. The *Chineſe Philoſophy* labours under a conſiderable Imperfection, which we have in another Place hinted at as the Reaſon that they are not entirely ſenſible of its Sublimity and Profoundneſs. The Notions of the *Chineſe* were, indeed, *determinate*, but not diſtinct enough, and hence their Incapacity to bring them to *determinate Propoſitions*, and to reduce theſe when demonſtrated, to *Syſtem*. And indeed, the capital Affairin every Branch of *Philoſophy* is, to form it of *determinate* Propoſitions, and *accurate Definitions*, (10) and fit it for publick and private Utility, and for the Service of a Community, by framing ſuch accurate Definitions and determinate Propoſitions. And therefore the *Chineſe* to remedy this Defect, admitted nothing as fully evident, but what was eſtabliſhed by Experiment. And as they made the Experiment upon themſelves,

(10) *Accurate Definitions.* A Definition conſiſts in putting together Terms which give a compleat and determinate Idea of the Thing defined. *Compleat*, when there is a ſufficient Number of Marks or Signs to know the Object again by. *Determinate*, when neither more nor fewer Marks than are requiſite: It will be here proper to obſerve for once, that every Definition is either *Nominal* or Real.

themſelves, they became accuſtomed to direct their Attention to the ſeveral Parts which conſtitute a *determinate* Notion, tho' incapable of diſtinctly enumerating them a-part. And thus by a World of Labour they attained to a Penetration of ſeeing thro' thoſe Things, in their Ideas, which in order to *abſtract* (11) any Notion from them, are to be ſeparated by the Operations of the Mind, tho' unable to diſtinguiſh and particularly enumerate them. The Way to this Reach of Penetration is arduous and long about, a much eaſier and ſhorter of arriving to the Notion of good Government is by a *Syſtem* of *Philoſophy* framed after our Manner. Nor is it every

(11) *Abſtract Notions*, are ſuch as repreſent a Thing ſeparately from another, whereof it is depending; or a Part of the Whole; and alſo *Modalities*, *Attributes* and *Relations*, as if they had every one of them a particular diſtinct Being. For Example, I am ſpeaking of the Rights of the Emperor in the Empire, and then I do it abſtractedly, and only in Relation to his Imperial Dignity, without taking any Notice that he is Arch-Duke of Auſtria, and King of Bohemia too. Further, *abſtract Notions* are to be conſidered as Ideas which are common to ſeveral *Individuals* and form *Species*; and again, which by the Combination of Things, common to ſeveral Species form *Genus*'s, ſee below N°. 16. The Ideas we form to ourſelves of the *Genuſſes* and *Specieſes* are merely *Abſtractions*, which have no Being in themſelves but in the Subjects from which they were abſtracted.

one that is capable of ſurmounting the Difficulties, which fall in the Way, in attempting to acquire a Penetration of diſentangling *determinate* Notions from confuſed Ideas, tho' he might procure himſelf diſtinct ones by a Syſtem. Beſides, the Way the *Chineſe* took was dangerous, and yet the Condition of the Times allowed of no other. For neither the Penetration, by Means of which determinate Notions are diſcovered in the confuſed Ideas of Things, can be brought to that Perfection as not ſometimes to fail; whereas *determinate* Propoſitions, when once demonſtrated, or firmly eſtabliſhed *a Poſteriori*, never fail. Nay, if any one have his Mind repleniſhed with diſtinct Notions, ſuch a one will with more Eaſe, and to a greater Degree perfect his Powers of Penetration, than if he did only reſt contented in the Experimental Method of the *Chineſe*.

§ 9. *Why*

§ 9. *Why a Philoſopher by certain, and not doubtful Meaſures, promotes civil Happineſs.*

BUT let us return from this Digreſſion, and apply all our Attention to the Difference between philoſophical and hiſtorical Knowledge (12) which laſt from its Form, we call common, and with what Endowments, which are wanting to him who is no *Philoſopher*, a *ruling Philoſopher* may be furniſhed. If we are to expect any Help from Philoſophy towards procuring civil Happineſs; it muſt ariſe from the Difference of the Knowledge of the *Philoſopher* from that of the Man who is no *Philoſopher*, and from the ruling *Philoſopher* being furniſhed with the Endowments, which muſt be wanting to the *unphiloſophical Ruler*. The *ruling Philoſo-*

(12) *Philoſophical Knowledge* gives us an Account of the Things themſelves and their Poſſibility; whereas *hiſtorical Knowledge* is only limited to the Knowledge of Facts. The Vulgar know hiſtorically that the Moon is eclipſed; But an Aſtronomer knows why, and can give a Reaſon for it.

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pher has *determinate* and diſtinct Notions about the Affairs to be managed on the Score of the Community, nor adventures upon any Deciſion ſo long as he is deſtitute of ſuch Notions, unleſs when under the Neceſſity of acting. But when the Neceſſity of Action directs the purſuing Notions, that are not *determinate* enough, nor entirely evident; he adventurouſly commits not the Safety of the Community to the doubtful Fluctuations of *Chance*, but wholly intent upon the Event obſerves the Laws of *Probability* (13), in order

(13) *Probability.* The logical Truth of Propoſitions conſiſts in the Conformity of the *Predicate* with the *Subject*; and this Conformity will immediately appear when the *Predicate* is an eſſential Quality of the *Subject*, and at once a Mark or Sign of its Definition; or by the Help of a certain Number of Circumſtances which are *Requiſites*, or are neceſſarily required to eſtabliſh the Truth. When all theſe *Requiſites*, all theſe Circumſtances do not appear, then Truth, Evidence, and Certainty give Way to Probability, whoſe Degrees alter according as fewer or more Requiſites are found, upon which a Propoſition is eſtabliſhed. It is alſo by this Knowledge of Probability only, that a Politician can take his Views and Meaſures, and generally ſpeaking, that we can act in Life. It ſeldom happens that we can abſolutely demonſtrate in what Reſpect one Thing may deſerve to be preferred to another; Human Wiſdom does not always chuſe the beſt Part, like Divine Wiſdom, which perfectly knows every Circumſtance; our Wiſdom therefore determines upon the Degrees of Probability.

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hereafter to redreſs the Defect of his Notions, and correct ſome Things not entirely agreeable to the Views of civil Happineſs, or afterwards in the like Caſe to expedite the Buſineſs in another, and different Manner. And if any one happens not to be a Philoſopher, ſuch a one diſtinguiſhes not between *determinate* and *indeterminate*, or between *diſtinct*, and *confuſed* Notions, and being without determinate and diſtinct Notions in the managing of Buſineſs he copies after others, doing the very Thing he imagines another would do in the like Caſe, and promiſes himſelf the ſame Succeſs that the *other* had. Nay, ſometimes certain Meaſures appear advantageous, which the Iſſue ſhews to be very pernicious. This may be explained by an Example, that the Difference may be perceived by thoſe, who have their Minds unaccuſtomed to *philoſophical* Terms and Notions, If the Queſtion were, *whether thoſe who apply themſelves to Learning be obliged to reſort to domeſtic, or be allowed to reſort to foreign Univerſities?* In this Queſtion, the Determination of one who

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reaſons *philoſophically* differs from that of one who does not. An *unphiloſophical* Man ſwayed by any ſlight Reaſon, *as that the Money of a Country muſt not be carried out, directly determines in general, that a Law ſhould paſs againſt any one's reſorting for the future, on the Score of Study, to any other than a domeſtic Univerſity*, But a philoſophical Man does not ſo precipitately hurry into a Determination; but having well weighed the Reaſons both of *extrinſic and intrinſic Conſideration* (14), forms determinate Judgments, as follows.

" If the ſame Stock of Knowledge may " be gained in the ſame Time in a do- " meſtic and foreign Univerſity, and no " Regard be had to Expences, a domeſtic " has the Preference of a foreign Uni- " verſity. But if the Expences be taken " into the Account, and in a foreign Uni- " verſity one may learn at a ſmall Rate

(14) The *intrinſic* Reaſons are thoſe taken from the Nature of the Subject; for Example, the Sun gives Light, becauſe he is naturally a luminous Body. The *extrinſic* Reaſons are thoſe taken from outward Circumſtances, for Example. The Sun does not ſhine when in an Eclipſe, becauſe the Moon at that Time is between him and our Earth.

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" what in a domeſtic would require much " greater Charges; the poorer Sort may " be allowed to reſort to a foreign Uni- " verſity." Namely, in the firſt Place the Queſtion muſt be determined from the End of Study, as much Damage would redound to the Commonwealth, were theſe excluded from the Benefit of ſolid Inſtruction in an Univerſity. In the ſecond Place a Regard is to be paid to *extrinſic* Reaſons, among which the Expences are one, to be laid out on an academical Education, ſo far as they may be conſiſtent with the Ends of it. Among *extrinſic* Reaſons comes the Conſideration, that Money is not to be carried out of the Country. Where again we only determine after a Diſcuſſion of Circumſtances. Let the following *determinate* Propoſition ſerve as a Specimen. " If Foreigners reſorting to our Univerſity " bring more Money in, than our Natives " reſorting to a foreign Univerſity carry " out, and it be apprehended that Foreig- " ners would be prohibited from reſorting " to us, if an Injunction were laid on our " Natives to frequent our own Univerſities

" only; we muſt allow our Natives " to chuſe at Pleaſure which ſhall ſeem " more Commodious." We have only given Specimens of ſome *determinate* Propoſitions, which he, who reaſons *philoſophically* in determining the Queſtion propoſed, uſes as Principles. For when the Queſtion is to be determined in general without any Regard had to the Circumſtances of any particular Caſe, an ample Theory will be framed from a Stock of *determinate* Propoſitions. But if particular Circumſtances are to be taken into the Account; then each of theſe being diſcuſſed either from the Theory I juſt now mentioned; that Propoſition is pitched upon to infer the Determination, which contains thoſe Circumſtances, or now only at length ſuch Propoſition is inveſtigated, that the Determination may ſtand on a firmer Bottom. For if the Happineſs of a Common-Wealth ſhould claim Regard, it is not a Thing indifferent, whether you determine in general from any one extrinſical Reaſon, or according to Diverſity of Circumſtances you pronounce diverſely, or whether you

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uſe *indeterminate* or *determinate* Propoſitions. For in the former Caſe the Expectation of the Event is quite dubious, nay often none at all, whereas in the latter it is certain. In the former Caſe we are always ro apprehend a much greater Number of Evils, which affect the State of the Community, nay very often quite ruin it. In the latter it is certain nothing is admitted, which is repugnant to Civil Happineſs, as only agreeable thereto Propoſitions are determined, and *extrinſecal* Reaſons are allowed their Weight ſo far only as they conſpire with the ultimate End of a Common-Wealth. It is therefore evident that a Community is happy, when all Deciſions are made by Means of *determinate Propoſitions*, and that a Bar is put to their Happineſs, and a Door ſet wide open to a Train of Evils, when the Determination is according to vague Notions: Conſequently it is more for the Intereſts of Civil Happineſs, *when thoſe, who rule, reaſon philoſophically* than when they do not. *They, who reaſon unphiloſophically* are often wont to precipitate Judgments,

with the beſt Intention chuſing Meaſures the very worſt. But *they who reaſon philoſophically*, are far from any ſuch Precipitancy, and duely diſtinguiſh what is truly conducive to publick Welfare from what is otherwiſe. Thoſe therefore, for the generality ſtumble by Chance upon what may ſuit with Civil Happineſs; theſe, with a certain reſolved Purpoſe promote it. And therefore, it is apparent how much it would be for the Intereſt of a *Community*, were *the philoſophical Theory* of each particular Branch of Buſineſs compleated, and were the Minds of thoſe, who have the Management of them tinctured therewith! And before ever ſuch a *Theory* can be extant, it is impoſſible that thoſe employed in managing publick Affairs, ſhould reaſon *philoſophically* about them. Hitherto Men of an extraordinary Penetration employ their Thoughts on enriching the *Mathematical Sciences* with new Diſcoveries, and quit not that Province, but for the Contemplation of *Nature*. But the *practical Philoſophy*, which is neceſſary for the Purpoſes of good Government, and on which the Safety of a Community depends,

pends, lies quite neglected and uncultivated, which yet might no leſs be enriched with new Diſcoveries, provided what we are already Maſters of were reduced to *Syſtem*, and that Men of Penetration, and Genius, and Experience, and Skill in Buſineſs, would conjointly employ their Talents on the improving it. And this is the very Butt to which I levell all my Efforts, nor do I quite deſpair of rouſing the Attention of others, that for the future they may not overlook Things, that are experienced to be of ſo ſalutary Effects to Mankind, when reduced to Practice.

§ 10. *Why Philoſophy cannot fully maſter the Events of Affairs?*

BUT let no one imagine that we entertain the Opinion, as if the Event of all public Affairs could be aſcertained, when thoſe who rule, take Occaſion to reaſon *philoſophically* about them. For the Reaſon is manifeſt why the Event is uncertain, tho' the Theory of all the Branches of Buſineſs

Buſineſs were perfectly underſtood. Namely, we determine about expediting a Buſineſs only by the diſcurſive Judgment, conſequently by the Means of Ratiocination, by which, what is requiſite to be done is inferred as a Concluſion from *Premiſes*. Now if the *Theory* of Buſineſs were perfect, which yet every one knows is not the Caſe, and thoſe ſkilled in the more genuine Philoſophy are ſenſible cannot eaſily be executed, *Theorems* (15) might be found therein containing the genuine Deciſions for each particular Buſineſs. And ſince thoſe Theorems ſtand in the Place of a *Major* in *practical Ratiocinations*, by which a particular Caſe is determined, or what ought to be done in a given particular Caſe is gathered; and before it can appear, whether this or that *Theorem* have Place in a

(15) *Theorems*, are ſpeculative Propoſitions ſuſceptible of Demonſtration; they differ from *Axioms*, which have their Demonſtration in themſelves, becauſe the Connection of the *predicate* with the *Subject*, is ſo evident, that it needs not to be infer'd by a Series of Arguments. An Example of a *Theorem* follows: *The Earth is a Planet.* This Propoſition, tho' true is ſuſceptible of Proofs. An Example of an *Axiom: A ſimple Being cannot be divided.* This is not capable of Demonſtration, becauſe common Senſe teaches us that a ſimple Being which could be divided, would involve a Contradiction.

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given Caſe, what the Caſe now is ought to be evident, conſequently each Circumſtance by which the preſent Caſe is determined, that we may have the *Minor* of that Syllogiſm, ought to be known. For it is not always in our Power, what Diligence ſoever we uſe in the Reſearch, to come at the Knowledge of each Circumſtance, which enters the preſent Caſe. This is abundantly evident a *Poſteriori*, from which too the Proof is to be ſought, when we would diſcourſe about what is uſually wont to happen. And tho' Reaſons ſhould be aſſigned, why it is impoſſible ſome Circumſtances ſhould be known by us in a given particular Caſe, yet in the preſent it is not neceſſary to enquire into them. And therefore neither does it appear, that the *Theorem* is applicable in the given particular Caſe: For ſince in theſe the Notion of the Subject is intirely *determinate*, but our particular Caſe not ſo, by the Suppoſition, as it is not evident, to what Theorem the preſent Caſe is to be re-

ferred,

ferred, as an Individual (16) is to its Species. It is, therefore very plain, that the Event of Things would not be aſcertained, tho' we preſuppoſe there were a perfect and every Way compleat Theory of Buſineſs extant. Yet it eaſily appears, that the Uncertainty muſt be leſs than when no ſuch perfect *Theory* of Buſineſs is ſuppoſed. For while that is wanting, an Uncertainty is derived upon the ſame particular Buſineſs from a two-fold Source. We are, beſides to note, if the *Theory* of *Philoſophy* be ſuppoſed perfect, we ſhould have an accurate *Theory* for eſtimating Degrees of *Probability*, conſequently leſs Incertainty

(16) *Individual*, is a ſimple Being determined in every Reſpect. The Similitude of *Individuals*; or the Combination of the Qualities, which are common to thoſe *Individuals*, conſtitutes the *Speciefes*; juſt as the Union or Combination of the Qualities which are common to the *Speciefes*, form the *Genuſes*. For Example: I ſee *Paul*, *Peter*, *John*, and they have all of them the ſame eſſential Qualities, which are common to all thoſe which have a Reſemblance with them, then I conclude from thence, that they are *Individuals* of the ſame Nature, and conſequently of the ſame *Species*, which we call *Man*. In the ſame Manner it is that from the *inferior Genuſes*, the *Superior* reſult, and that we come to the *ſupreme Genus*, which is the moſt extenſive, and the leaſt *determinate* of all. For Example. The Human Kind, or *Man*, is an *inferior Genus*, becauſe *he* is comprehended under a *Genus* of greater Extenſion, and conſequently *Superior*; which is that of living Creature; Now this *Genus* again is comprehended under a *Superior Genus*; which is that of *Being*.

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would remain about the *Minor* of a practical Syllogyſm, than when we have either no Principles at all, from which to determine about the Probability of the preſent Caſe, or our Principles are too general and vague, ſuch as we commonly uſe, when under a Neceſſity of determining we have Recourſe to probable Reaſons, as when in Civil Affairs we ſay *an Artiſt is to be believed in his own Art*, little ſolicitous whether he who is eſteemed an Artiſt, be really ſuch or no. And tho' neither by the moſt exact Theory of *Probability*, ſo as to leave nothing for us more to wiſh, it be poſſible, that we ſhould never ſwerve from Truth, yet we enjoy a double Advantage by obſerving the Laws of *Probability*, both which he muſt needs want, who in the Management of Buſineſs raſhly throws the Event upon the Favour of *Chance*. For if any one in his Affairs always very nicely obſerves the Laws of *Probability*, the Event will oftner anſwer his Wiſh, than when he determines beſides, or at leaſt without them. Again, if it happens that the Event anſwers not his Wiſh, he who manages the

Affair has not wherewith to reproach himſelf, and therefore being blameleſs in that Reſpect is at Eaſe in his own Mind. For, while one imagines that it was thro' his Fault, the Event proved abortive, the Mind is diſquieted, as we imagine it was in our Power to have avoided the Guilt of the Error. But, when we are clearly perſuaded, that we could not have reſolved otherwiſe about the Affair, conſiſtently with the Laws of Reaſon, Wiſdom, and Prudence; there is no Reaſon, why the Mind ſhould be diſquieted. But there is ſtill another Cauſe, which renders the Events of Buſineſs uncertain; tho' there were none of them, of which a moſt exquiſite Theory were not extant in Philoſophy. Namely, that manifold Connection and Dependence of every Thing in Nature upon each other, which we have explained in a whole Chapter of our general *Coſmologia*; many Impediments and Bars uſually offer to thoſe who are in the Management of any Buſineſs, which can neither be foreſeen nor often come to our Knowledge but after the Buſineſs is over, nay ſometimes

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eſcape all Notice. Now as theſe Impediments, which we are ignorant of, cannot be removed, and often thoſe that unexpectedly fall in our Way are inſurmountable, it again appears, ſuppoſing the Theory of *Philoſophy* never ſo accurate, the Event can by no Means be brought within the Compaſs of our Power. Theſe Things, indeed, we have added with the View, leaſt we ſhould ſeem to entertain grander Notions of Philoſophy than became us, by ſtarting ſuch Objections as without the Fault of Philoſophy, the Condition of Humanity does not admit a Solution of.

§ 11. *Why the Circumſpection of a Philoſopher in dubious Cauſes, is greater than that of any other Perſon.*

WE have ſeen, that when Cauſes are doubtful, notwithſtanding the *Theory* of *Philoſophy* were brought to Perfection, yet Recourſe muſt be had to the Laws of *Probability*, to which alſo the

Unphiloſophical Man recurs. And yet both the *philoſophical* and *unphiloſophical Man* differ in the very ſame Act, the former having different Principles of *Probability* from the latter: Let us mark the Difference between them. The *Philoſopher* uſually determines about Things from *intrinſecal* Reaſons, namely, ſuch as are derived from the Notions of the Things themſelves; but *he*, who reaſons *unphiloſophically*, commonly recurs to *extrinſecal* Reaſons, as thoſe of an intrinſecal Nature eſcape him. Hence it happens that in the Buſineſs of *Probability* the *Philoſopher* betakes himſelf to *intrinſecal*, at the Time the *Unphiloſophical* Man takes up with *extrinſecal* Reaſons. Let us ſuppoſe, *Titus* is recommended by *Mevius* to a vacant *Eccleſiaſtical Charge*, after adducing his Reaſons, why he judges him capable of filling that Place to advantage. Let us further ſuppoſe, that *Titus* is the Friend of *Mevius*; that from the perfect Knowledge he has of his excellent Endowments, and from his Ardour for the publick Good it is his principal Wiſh, that Men of Capacity

city were appointed for Places of Truſt. Now if He, who rules, be a *Philoſopher*, or reaſon philoſophically, when he would judge with *Probability*, whether *Titus* be furniſhed with thoſe Qualifications according to the Commendation of *Mevius* or no, he attends to the Proofs themſelves, and from their *intrinſecal Probability* forms a Judgment, admitting at the ſame Time the ſpecial *extrinſecal* Reaſons, as they may conſpire with the former: But the *Man* who is *no Philoſopher* comes directly to ſuſpect the Commendation of *Mevius* from the Conſideration that it is that of a Friend. The *Man*, therefore, who reaſons *philoſophically* uſes a far greater Degree of Circumſpection, than another whoſe Mind is untinctured with *Philoſophy*. For the former decides not without duely weighing the Caſe, the latter quite otherwiſe, but judging precipitately. No one, therefore, can doubt, but that he, who reaſons philoſophically behaves more circumſpectly than he who does not ſo; or who can heſitate a Moment, that the Man of greater Circumſpection does, in the Management

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of Buſineſs, more rightly conſult the publick Good, than the Man of leſs? In the latter Caſe a Man muſt reſolve to be more adventurous than in the former: And tho' ſometimes Fortune prevail over Counſel, yet no one, I dare ſay, will hence infer that the Buſineſs of Conſultation claims no Regard, as otherwiſe it would hence follow, that we are Hand over Head to run into any Thing. In my Judgment, if here to be allowed of any Weight, we are then only to hazard, when our Counſels fail in Certainty and Evidence, and that at the ſame Time, ſome Thing muſt be done; If any one would make the Experiment upon himſelf, how great the Difference is between Judgments *intrinſecally* and *extrinſecally probable*, he muſt in the firſt Place from the *Rational Philoſophy or Logick*, in which we have given the diſtinct Reaſon of Probability, pag. 587, be thoroughly well acquainted with the Difference between *intrinſecal* and *extrinſecal Probability*.

(17) *Directive Notions*, are certain Principles by which our Thoughts are guided, leading us to the Aim we had in View. They ſerve not only for diſcovering the right Way, which before

bability. And being furniſhed with the *Directing Notion* (17) as I call it, he may with *Probability* determine about any given Caſe, if he is capable of doing it from *intrinſecal Reaſons*, and a certain common *intrinſecal Principle* of *Probability*; and thus indeed he will come ſufficiently to perceive the Difference between intrinſecal and extrinſecal Probability. That the experiment is difficult, I readily allow; but it is not poſſible, that Things in themſelves of an arduous Nature ſhould come to be made of promiſcuous, or eaſy Uſe: Take it who can; let others for me aſcribe what Prerogative they will to an Appearance of Probability, for my Part it ſufficeth that every one, who is capable of making the Experiment, will readily come into my Opinion. It may ſerve as an Experiment, if one, who is capable, ſhould *determine* about a given Caſe from *intrinſecal* Reaſons of *Probability*, and another judge of the ſame Affair by Virtue of a common *extrinſecal* Principle, and the Reaſons of

before was unknown to us, but alſo to follow this Way without loſing it, when once found out. This properly belongs to ontological Notions.

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the Deciſions be compared together; it will, indeed, appear that the latter with Eaſe accompliſhes, what the other ſeems to labour and bring a great Way about; but upon uſing a greater Degree of Penetration and Attention, you will perceive the one to be in Noon-Day-light, the other in Mid-night Darkneſs; the one you will pronounce all Circumſpection, the other all Fool-hardineſs: Seeing Truth alone is our great Care and diſpaſſionate Concern, we cannot but own, that ſometimes alſo the *Philoſopher* muſt recur to *extrinſecal* Principles of *Probability*, ſhould the *Theory* of Buſineſs be ſuppoſed never ſo finiſhed, which is far from being the Caſe, nor likely to be ſo very ſoon. For ſometimes the Circumſtances, by which a Caſe is *determined*, or the *Determinations* which enter into the Notion of the Subject, are ſo few of them known to us, that it is better, to have Recourſe to *extrinſecal* Reaſons of *Probability*, than entirely depend on ſo ſmall a Number of *intrinſecal* ones. Thus if any one is recommended to us, the Commendation is conceived in

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ſuch Terms, that what Regard it claims, may be more ſecurely determined by *extrinſecal*, than by the *intrinſecal* Reaſons derived from the Commendation itſelf. As therefore, we readily grant this, Truth demands we ſay that the philoſophical and unphiloſophical Enquirer act not in the ſame Manner, when both of them have Recourſe to the ſame *extrinſecal* Principle of Probability. The *Philoſopher* applies this *Principle* (18) one Way, the *unphiloſophical* Perſon uſes it another Way. The Reaſon of this Diverſity is evident: the Man who reaſons philoſophically inquires into the Reaſon of the *probable Principle*, that not only its *Probability* but its *Truth* may appear, nay from its *Truth* he determines about the *Probability* and its various Degrees. And if the Reaſon of the *pro-*

(18) *Principle*, in N°. 13. I treated of *Probability*. A Philoſopher, who knows a great many Circumſtances, and penetrates into their Reaſons, is able to determine the Degrees of Probability, and to follow exactly the Rules regarding the Principle of Probability. It is a Kind of a Calculation, with the Help of which we act very nearly with as much Confidence, as if we had found out the very Truth itſelf. The *Trade* and *Commerce* of the World has really no other Baſis any more than *Games*, in particular thoſe wherein *Hazard* predominates.

bable Principle be evident, it is reduced to a *determinate* Propoſition, in which the Condition, under which it is true, is accurately expreſſed. Since therefore, in the Application a Regard is paid to it, the *Probability* is as exactly *determined*, as is poſſible in that Caſe by Virtue of that Principle: and from this the *Philoſopher* may be aſſured, that he has failed in none of thoſe Things, which are requiſite to the Fulfilling the Laws of *Probability* in the given Caſe: but, if any one reaſon unphiloſophically, he will be regardleſs about the Reaſon, on which the *probable Principle* reſts, and conſequently in the Application of it only conſider the vague Notion, anſwering to it. And therefore it may hence with Eaſe be inferred, that the *Probability* cannot be determined ſo exactly, as it is by a *Philoſopher* by Virtue of that Principle. And now no one can queſtion, but that he is the more circumſpect Man in the Management of Buſineſs, who acts up to all the Laws of *Probability* in the given Caſe, than he who takes not all that Care. And therefore the Man who

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reaſons *philoſophically* about the Management of Buſineſs, does in dubious Cauſes, which are at the Diſpoſal of *Fortune* ſhew a greater Circumſpection than another who does not. What has been hitherto ſaid may be illuſtrated by the Principle, *that the Commendation of a Friend is ſuſpicious*, which every one acknowledges holds not univerſally true. Nor upon any other Score is it ranked in the Number of Principles, and thoſe in themſelves *probable*, than that being devoid of Univerſality it may fail. And if the Reaſon, why it holds not univerſally true, be inquired into, there may many be found. Indeed, if a Man regards *Truth* alone, and not Paſſion, he commends not his Friend but conſiſtently with the Truth: But that this Caſe is not to be reckoned impoſſible, and that it would be a very frequent one, *if they who rule were Philoſophers*, will appear from what follows. 'Tis needleſs to object; that it is poſſible for the greateſt Stickler for Truth to be deceived, perſuading himſelf better Things of his Friend, than he really can claim: For it may be ſhewn that Truth

cannot prevail over Paſſion or Affection, whilſt the Qualities of a Friend ſeem to be better than they really are. But it is not our Buſineſs now to digreſs ſo far. In like Manner if a fallacious Commendation, ſhould prove a Diſadvantage to one, and he be Maſter of the Penetration to foreſee this, he will not recommend a Friend, inconſiſtently with the Truth. Further, thoſe who are laid by the Paſſion of Glory commend only ſuch as they deem to be deſerving. And if they have the Penetration, to be able to diſcern the Truth, it is impoſſible they ſhould commend an unworthy Perſon. From whence it appears, that, if any one be laid by the View of Glory, and can diſtinguiſh the Deſerving from the Undeſerving, he will only recommend a deſerving Friend. I forbear adding any more, as it is not now our Purpoſe to frame the *Theory*, of the unſuſpected Teſtimony of a Friend: It may ſuffice to ſhew only by Example, how the Man is oftner deceived, who devoid of all Theory, judges according to this general Principle, *that the Commendation of a Friend*

Friend is ſuſpicious, and what greater Degree of Circumſpection the Man manifeſts, who has his Head well ſtocked with that *Theory*. And the *Theorems* we have juſt propoſed, imply ſuch an Example. It is further to be noted, that *he* who reaſons *philoſophically*, and *he* who does not ſo, often put the ſame Principle to different Uſes. For there are ſome general Principles, which have no Defect, while you uſe them only to excite the Attention; Namely, that nothing be reſolved upon thro' Haſte and Precipitancy. And theſe the *Philoſopher* with no other View uſes, while the *Theory* of the Buſineſs is within his Reach; which failing him, he is in this Particular no *Philoſopher*. But as we have now no Concern with the Limits of *Philoſophy*, for ſettling the ſeveral Branches of Buſineſs, we only enquire how he, who is to manage a Buſineſs, is to reaſon about it *philoſophically*: In which Caſe it ought to be ſuppoſed, that the Theory of Buſineſs is within his Reach. For as he who reaſons philoſophically in order to avoid Precipitation in Judgment, makes a right uſe

of

of the Principle; *He*, who does not reaſon *philoſophically*, perverts its Uſe, when thro' Defect of other Principles, which by Means of ſome others are to be recollected by the Mind and brought to View, he uſes it to determine by. That very *Principle*, which we applied for illuſtrating what went before, namely *that the Commendation of a Friend is ſuſpicious*, may ſerve as an Example. For *he* who reaſons *philoſophically*, infers by Virtue of that Principle, that we are here alſo to have a Regard to *extrinſecal* Reaſons, namely, whether the Paſſion of Love may not influence the *Commendation*; and which, in the Caſe of *intrinſecal Probability* ought by no Means to be deemed ſuperfluous, becauſe that a *Probability* mixed both of the *intrinſecal* and *extrinſecal* is greater than what is purely *intrinſecal*. But the Man who reaſons *unphiloſophically*, does according to that *Principle* directly decide, that no Regard is to be paid to the Commendation of a Friend, without attending to the *intrinſecal* Reaſons of *Probability*, were there never ſo many in the Caſe. And therefore by the

Application

Application of one and the ſame Principle, the Man who reaſons *unphiloſophically* falls into a Precipitation of Judgment, which another who reaſons *philoſophically*, is on his Guard againſt. The Man, therefore who reaſons *philoſophically* carries himſelf with Circumſpection in the Management of Buſineſs, but the unphiloſophical Man leſs ſo. We hint in Paſſage, that a *Philoſopher* may apply Principles to Advantageous Purpoſes, which in the Hands of an *Unphiloſophical* Man may prove noxious; nor is there ſcarce any Principle of the leaſt Degree of *Probability*, which a *Philoſopher* may not put to excellent Uſe. Thoſe things are to be noted well; for nothing is uſually more frequent, than that on the Score of ſome perverſe Uſe, which commonly is not the Manner of Philoſophers, we come to reject as uſeleſs, what might have been ſurprizingly uſeful. We ſhall have Occaſion, God willing, to treat of theſe Things more fully in the *Logicks* of *Probability*: But as ſtill much remains to be done, before ever we can enter upon that Subject, there will

will hereafter be Place in theſe *Horæ* of propoſing ſome Specimens for the Imitation of others.

§ 12. *Why it is the Effect of Philoſophy, that every Thing in a Community is done according to Truth.*

FROM what has been hitherto ſaid, I think it ſufficiently evident, that if a *Ruler* be a *Philoſopher*, he more certainly knows the Things requiſite to the Ends of good Government, than if he were not. 'Tis now further to be ſhewn, how firm his Purpoſe is of doing nothing but what may make for the publick Happineſs. 'Tis too notorious that commonly little Regard is paid to Truth, a great Deal to Paſſion. And when we come to uſe philoſophical Perſpectives, wherewith to ſpy human Affairs, both of a publick and private Nature, inquiring into the Reaſons of Things that are done, and why they are done, we become abundantly apprized; that the evil Times,

Times, of which Mankind complains, are owing to nothing elſe, but to the Prevalence of Paſſion over Truth. We have ſeveral Reaſons for not engaging now in a more particular Proof of theſe Things. It will therefore ſuffice, and 'tis what our Deſign demands, that then only Truth is placed on the Throne, when Paſſion is baniſhed by *Philoſophy*. For I ſcruple not to affirm, that the *Philoſopher* ever acts from a Principle of Reaſon, and not from Paſſion. I fear much, I ſhall paſs with many for a Madman, propoſing as I do Things ſo much both out of the common Experience and Hearing of Mankind. That the Attention, therefore, which is extremely neceſſary, may not fail, I muſt diſpel the Clouds of Prejudice, before I can ever attempt to procure Credit to what I advance. When the *Philoſophy* of the virtuous Conduct of Life, and not of the empty Speculations of the Schools, was taught, what now ſeems thro' Precipitancy to be ſaid too favourably, was then a Thing well known, and common in the World. *Vitruvius* is an Inſtance; who

from his Books of *Architecture* appears to have been taught this Advantage of Philoſophy from Experience. " It was for-
" merly a Law of an old Standing at
" *Epheſus*, that an Architect undertaking
" any publick Work, ſhould, upon giving
" in an Eſtimate to the Magiſtrate, en-
" gage his own Goods or Eſtate, till the
" Work was finiſhed. And if no more
" than a Fourth of the Eſtimate was diſ-
" burſed upon the Work, it was to be ad-
" ded to the Eſtimate, and made good
" out of the publick Money. But if
" more than a Fourth was expended, the
" Money was charged on his Goods to
" compleat the Work". As ſuch Laws prevail not every where, by which the Impoſition of *Architects* in engaging Gentlemen in a vaſt Profuſion of Expences, and ruining them in their Fortunes is reſtrained; *Vitruvius* has Recourſe to *Philoſophy*, as to a Sheet-Anchor, with which he would have the Mind of the Architect tinctured, that he may be honeſt and juſt, and without the Stain of Avarice, which he judges a principal Thing, as no Work can truly be

be carried on without Fidelity and Integrity, and Unobnoxiouſneſs to Bribery and Corruption, with Gravity maintaining his Dignity, by his good Character and Reputation. It therefore appears that *Vitruvius* was perſuaded in his own Mind, that a *philoſophical Architect* acts from Truth and not from Paſſion, in order to procure himſelf a good Name in every Thing, and avoid Reprehenſion; And it is evident that what was ſaid of the philoſophical Architect, may in general be applied to any other, who undertakes the Management of any Buſineſs, or the carrying of any Work. It alſo appears, it was by Means of *Philoſophy* that *Vitruvius* arrived to the Reputation he boaſts of. Let any one, who doubts this, read but the Prefaces to *Auguſtus Cæſar*, which he has prefixed to each Book of Architecture. For from what he every where ſays of himſelf, it will appear, how great his Care, and Solicitude was, that acting from a Principle of Truth, and Honour, he might gain a good Name, and that a laſting one. What the Love of Truth, which *Philoſophy* itſelf inſpires, can effect in *Rulers*, the

Chineſe Emperors YAO and *XUN* are pregnant Inſtances, who when they would bring the Empire, founded by their Predeceſſors, to a Pitch of greater Perfection, and yet attempt nothing raſhly, paſſing over their own Sons, they choſe for Succeſſors, and made Partners of the Empire thoſe they judged equal to ſo great a Taſk. For *YAO*, who, from his Works appears to have been well ſkilled in *Aſtronomy* and *Philoſophy*, tho' he had nine Sons, ordered *XUN* to be his Succeſſor, whom, moved with the Fame of his Obedience, he firſt tried as a *Miniſter*, and afterwards as a *Partner* in the *Empire* for eight and twenty Years. And *XUN* himſelf treading in the Steps of *YAO*, paſſing over his own Sons, ordered that *YU*, who afterwards got the Surname of *Great*, ſhould ſucceed, and he was pleaſed to make him his *Collegue*, in the Empire for ſeventeen Years. But there are other Arguments, by which it may appear, that thoſe Emperors, whom the *Chineſe* own as Patterns to all ſucceeding *Princes*, determined every Thing according to Truth, without giving in any Thing to

Paſſion.

Paſſion. For *YAO* turning his whole Attention to the Miscarriages of his People, and to the public Calamities, did by his great Penetration inquire into the Reaſons of both, and wholly bent upon finiſhing the Form of Government, he principally applied his Attention whether by prudent Laws, and by his own Example he might not prevent any Miſconduct of the Subjects, and by a better Method of Government obviate publick Calamities. Wherefore when in theſe Laws he ſaw the Reaſon of the Misconduct of his People and of the publick Calamities, thoſe Calamities no leſs than the Misconduct of his People he uſually charged on himſelf alone. His Succeſſor *XUN* was ſo great a Lover of Truth, that diſtruſting his own Abilities, he would know the Opinions of others both about himſelf and his Actions. He therefore ſet up to publick View a *Table*, in which he would have any one put down any Misconduct of his he obſerved, that upon any Examination he might ſeaſonably rectify what might prove detrimental to the Community; nor would he

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ever make any Conſtitution, that might juſtly be blamable, and conſequently tend to the Detriment of the Publick, that, after the Manner of the *Chineſe*, who were of Opinion, that the Emperors ſhould by their own Example both teach the Subjects their Duty, and bind them to it, he might oblige them to act up to what Reaſon and the Publick Welfare required. Here you ſee the Effect of *Philoſophy* in *philoſophical Rulers*, and that the ſame holds in a *ruling Philoſopher*; *Confucius* the great *Chineſe* Philoſopher ſhews by his own Example. For having often acted the Part of a Governor of a Province, and Miniſter of State, in order to gain clearer Notions of Government, if apprized of any Obſcurity ſtill remaining in his own Notions; when at any Time it happened that good Meaſures were approved, nay commended, and bad ones put to Execution, thro' the Prevalency of Paſſion over Truth, deſpiſing Honours, deſpiſing Riches, he quitted the Court, not caring to continue in a Place, where Paſſion, not Truth was made the Rule of acting. Since there-

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fore, I have evinced that *ruling Philoſophers* and *philoſophical Rulers* gave in nothing to Paſſion, but in all to Truth; It will now further remain to be ſhewn after our Way, how the Mind may be diſpoſed by Philoſophy, ſo as always to act by Truth, and never by Paſſion. If any one be well ſtored with a ſufficiency of Philoſophy, ſuch a one clearly ſees, what makes either for or againſt the publick Welfare. Wherefore as the Appetite is carried towards what is known to be good, ſhould any Thing offer to divert it from the Purſuit, a Kind of Reluctancy is felt, upon being forced to bend it the contrary Way. Philoſophy therefore, does us this Piece of Service by this Evidence of Knowledge, that we are not carried away by the Violence of Paſſion, to determine and act thro' Precipitancy. It further appears that Truth gives us a Pleaſure, even in the State of Contemplation, and that, that Pleaſure is then extraordinary, when there is nothing to interrupt it. Since therefore we are in Love with what yields a Pleaſure; the Love of Truth is by the Study of Philoſophy formed

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in our Minds, and comes daily to gain greater Ground the longer we are converſant in it: This Love renders the Appetite of the Man acting from Truth the ſtronger, and with the greater Difficulty diverted the contrary Way, and at the ſame Time oppoſes and reſiſts the Paſſion, which endeavours to hurry the Man in the oppoſite Path. And thus Philoſophy proves a Help in overcoming the Paſſions, that run counter to Truth. If the *Ruler* reaſons *philoſophically*, he arms himſelf againſt future Events, whilſt in Purſuit of the *Theory* of publick Buſineſs, with the Purpoſe of procuring for himſelf a Stock of *political Knowledge*, he reflects of what Advantage *Civil Prudence* may prove therein; Hence it happens that the Truth of a particular Buſineſs gives him a Pleaſure, and the Love of it comes to be inſtilled into his Mind, ſo as now to be diſpoſed to act from Truth in this very Buſineſs, and to be furniſhed with ſpecial Aſſiſtances to conquer, upon any Occaſion of acting the Paſſions oppoſite to Truth. This ſpecial Diſpoſition renders the Purpoſe firmer, and the

ſpecial Aſſiſtances are ſtronger than the general, eſpecially when the general accompany. *He* who is ſo far a *Philoſopher*, as from the more intimate View of Truth to enjoy a Pleaſure, becauſe he is certain that he has Truth in Proſpect, and burns with a ſincere Love to it, which derives from this Pleaſure; he alſo prefers Reputation to Riches, to Pleaſures, and to Friendſhip, nor ever reckons any other Thing a greater Good. Hence ariſe thoſe Sayings of the Ancients: *Life and Reputation go Hand in Hand: If you loſe every Thing be ſure to keep your Reputation*, and the like. A *Philoſopher* therefore pays the greateſt Regard to his Reputation, as not to do any Thing deſerving a juſt Reprehenſion. 'Tis much the very ſame as if one ſhould put violent Hands on himſelf, when influenced to ſtruggle againſt the Truth, he is thoroughly perſuaded of in his own Mind. It cannot then be doubted, but that it is a Matter of very great Difficulty to divert ſuch a one from the Purpoſe of acting from Truth, and any Attempt with that View upon him would be oppoſed by

him with all his Might. If therefore the *Ruler* be a *Philoſopher*, there is nothing he deſires more than the Reputation of ruling well. And from this Purpoſe he never ſuffers himſelf to be drawn aſide. Now as he rates and meaſures good Government by the publick Happineſs, it is plain he is wholly bent to promote that, and with Difficulty is drawn away from what he knows to be agreeable thereto. When Men ſhall apply to Philoſophy in our Manner, the Deſire of acting from a Principle of Truth, which is now ſo uncommon, will then come to be more common, and Mankind then partake of the Fruits which Philoſophy yields, whenever it has taken Root. And to favour the nearer Proſpect of theſe Fruits, we ſpare neither Time, nor Expences, nor Labour in bringing Philoſophy to greater Degrees of Perfection.

§ 13.

§. 13. *How much it is the Intereſt of the Publick that Truth, not Paſſion, be the Rule in every Thing.*

BUT let no one imagine it a Matter of Indifference whether Truth in all Things be made the Rule of our Conduct, or ſomething be indulged to Paſſion, as Prudence directs the Attention to *extrinſecal* Reaſons, conſequently ſome Indulgence to Paſſion at Times. For the Whole of Publick Happineſs depends on a Principle of Truth being made the Rule, or Standard in every Thing. And then it is ſo, if nothing be done but what we certainly know to be conducive to this Happineſs. If therefore we ſuffer Paſſion to carry us aſide from Truth, we do thoſe Things, which, if not in all Reſpects, yet in ſome, are inconſiſtent with Happineſs, unleſs Chance direct for us to the End of Government, as to the Goal, what in its own Nature was apt to ſwerve and depart from it. For it is ſo ordered

by Divine Providence, that the different and contrary Aberrations or Swervings of Men in general produce a ſalutary Effect for the Publick, when yet the Tendency of each apart is to its Ruin; and as by Virtue of the Connection of Things, which we have in another Place explained, what of itſelf would prove detrimental, may come to be corrected and prove ſalutary. But that any one may underſtand of what Concern it is in a common-Wealth that every Thing be done from a Principle of Truth, let him attend to the Complaints which are uſually prefered againſt thoſe *in Publick Truſts*. Let us ſuppoſe a Number of well grounded Complaints made againſt the *Judges* in the Adminiſtration of *Juſtice*, the groundleſs we wave, ſuch as we readily grant the Bulk of Complaints may be, tho' they muſt be fewer when the well grounded are deducted. What, pray, is the Reaſon that he who diſcharges the Office of a Judge, pronounces an iniquous Sentence, or protracts the Time in adminiſtring Juſtice? Doubtleſs no other, than that either he knows not what in

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the given Caſe is Juſtice, or influenced by extrinſecal Reaſons, Paſſion hinders his following a more equitable Opinion, or that both theſe concur to carry the Mind aſtray. No one doubts of this: The common People themſelves, ſhew they have juſt Grounds of Complaint, at one Time charging the Ignorance of the Judges, at another, the Paſſions which they indulge and give Way to. As little therefore can any one doubt but that Judges will be equitable, and adminiſter Juſtice impartially, if they are inſtructed in the Laws, ſo as not to err thro' Ignorance, and free from Paſſion, ſo as not to ſwerve from the Path of Truth. Here no great Degree of Penetration is neceſſary to ſee, that what has been affirmed of Judges is applicable to any other Set of Men. For if a Judge deviate from Truth thro' Ignorance of the Law; this happens not from his intermeddling in Law, but from his being ignorant of what he ought to know. Wherefore in every other Caſe it muſt happen, that one cannot act from Truth, becauſe he knows it not. In like Manner if a

Judge

Judge allow himſelf to be ſwayed by Paſſion, ſo as to paſs an illegal Sentence, it is not Paſſion that miſleads him ſo far as he diſcharg'd the Office of a Judge, but ſo far as being void of the Love of Truth, he indulges his Paſſion. Wherefore it again appears, that in every other Caſe it ought to happen, that the Perſon deſtitute of the Love of Truth, ſuffers himſelf to be hurried away by the Tide of his Paſſions. But when a Judge averſe to Truth, and hurried along by violent Paſſions paſſes an injuſt Sentence, and thereby does an Injury to the Publick, the Injury ariſes from his not acting from a Principle of Truth. It is therefore evident that the Injury muſt equally happen what Office ſoever one diſcharges in a Community, if ſuch a one acts not from Truth, but ſuffers himſelf to be carried away by his Paſſions. The Inſtance, therefore, of a Judge is abundantly ſufficient to evince *a Poſteriori*, what has been already eſtabliſhed *a Priori*. If any one would attentively conſider *the various Fates of Communities*, he will be abundantly ſenſible that every Thing went to ruin on

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no other Score, than that thoſe who ſhould have been the Guardians of the publick Safety, never acted from a Principle of Truth. But on a Thing ſo plain 'tis needleſs to inſiſt any longer. It ſufficeth to have well conſidered what Utility a *Community* may promiſe itſelf from *Philoſophy*, as to it we are indebted, that we act from Truth, and give in nothing to Paſſion. For I doubt not in the leaſt, but that many more will by this be excited to the Cultivation of *Philoſophy* in our Manner, and after it is cultivated and improved, the *Minds* of many more, who have *publick Charges*, be deeply tinctured with it, and thus the publick Happineſs be ſtill the more advanced.

§ 14. *How a Philoſopher diſtinguiſhes the Deciſions of Caſes?*

THO' from what has been ſaid, abundantly appears what we propoſed to prove; namely *that Communities, will be happy, if Kings are Philoſophers*; as

as we reſolved to reſt in generals, and not digreſs to particulars, yet one Thing ſtill remains, which ought by no Means to be omitted, as generally 'tis what Men fail in very much: Namely if any Buſineſs be under Deliberation, a twofold Caſe may offer. For either the *Theory* of the Buſineſs is underſtood by thoſe that deliberate about it, whether they learned it, from the *Sciences*, or diſcovered it before *a priori*; or whether they acquired it by *Experience*; or it is not underſtood. In the firſt Caſe, the Determination ſhould be made by applying the General Principles to this ſingular Caſe, which has but little Difficulty in it, ſo that a Reſolution may be immediately taken. In the latter Caſe, we muſt inveſtigate *a priori* what is proper to be done, that the Community may be indemnified; a Thing often attended with much Difficulty, as by ſudden extemporary Votes and Meaſures an aſſured Event cannot be ſecured to us. Men, who are no *Philoſophers*, commonly confound theſe Caſes, but *Philoſophers* accurately diſtinguiſh them. For the *Philoſopher* knows how

how that in any given Caſe we muſt *determine* by the *Diſcurſive Judgment*, what is proper to be done; and conſequently the Meaſure, or Reſolution is to be inferred *Syllogiſtically* by Way of *Concluſion*. Wherefore ſince the Condition of the preſent Buſineſs whatever it be, only furniſhes the *Minor* of the *Syllogiſm*, you ſhould make the general Principle containing what is proper to be done, familiar to yourſelf, when what muſt be done is to be determined extemporaneouſly. The *Philoſopher* therefore diſtinguiſhes this Caſe from the other; from this, that no Principle, containing the *Theory* of that particular Buſineſs does then offer to himſelf and Collegues. When none occurs either from a Train of Meditation, or from conſulting the Books extant on the Subject, he readily owns, ſuch Meaſures ought to be taken, as the puplick Happineſs ſhall not ſuffer by. And becauſe a *Philoſopher* is furniſhed with the *Art of Invention*, and conſequently capable of making out unknown Truths either with Certainty or Probability; and being free from Precipitation, he is on his

guard, leaſt determining with leſs Circumſpection he ſhoul'd truſt the whole Event with *Fortune* alone. And on this very Account we underſtand how much it is the Intereſt of a Community that theſe two Caſes be kept diſtinct; leaſt thro' Precipitation, the Safety of the Community be endangered by thoſe very Perſons, who purpoſe to promote it. We have elſewhere ſhewn that there ſhould be a peculiar College in a Community, in which the Theory of the ſeveral Branches of Buſineſs not yet diſcovered, ſhould be inveſtigated, to be a Help to thoſe who have not Time for ſuch long and often diffuſe Speculations, were they of themſelves never ſo capable of being Inventors. Men eminent for their ſkill in the Management of Buſineſs have approved of this Scheme and among theſe 'tis ſufficient to name the *Count of Beichling*, that great and Eminent *Miniſter to the King of Poland*; with whom I have had the Honour of an Epiſtolary Correſpondence for ſome Years paſt. But of this we ſhall treat more fully in the *Civil* or *Political Philoſophy*.

§. *Whether*

§. 15. *Whether Government has hitherto been carried on, without the Help of Philoſophy.*

NOTHING then remains but to remove an Objection, which may be eaſily anſwered, and which we foreſee " ſome will readily make. We ſhall doubt- " leſs be deemed injurious to the Charac- " ters of the *Supreme Rulers* and their " *Miniſters*, as incapable, as it ſhould " ſeem, to govern well, becauſe no *Phi-* " *loſophers*". But this Objection cannot in the leaſt affect us, tho' we confidently affirm that the *Affairs of Government* cannot be managed without *Philoſophy*. For tho' we are unacquainted with the Characters, of the ſeveral Contrivers of the Forms, and other Things relating to *Government*; yet doubtleſs a great Deal here, as to the Buſineſs of framing Salutary Laws, is owing to a *Philoſophical Skill*. And as the *Roman Lawyers* encreaſed the Number of the Laws, and rendered each Doctrine or Head of Law more perfect by

Philoſophical Reaſonings, that *Ulpian* ſaid, they affect a genuin not a counterfeit *Philoſophy*; ſo in like Manner neither were the *Conſtitutions* of a *Community* originally ſettled without the Aids of *Philoſophy*. The Things therefore, which depend on the Form of a *Common-Wealth*, and the *Conſtitutions* of *Anceſtors*, are all of them to be laid to the Score of *Philoſophy*: Only it ſhould be remarked, that in a length of Time, Neceſſity, the greater Inſtructor of Mankind, ſupplied the Place of *Philoſophy*. Namely that the Neceſſity we are under of acting, gives an Edge to the Attention, ſo as more narrowly to conſider what might otherwiſe eaſily eſcape Regard. We have ſometimes ſuch a Fund of Things, that the Attention has only to obſerve them, which at another Time could not be diſcovered without an Effort of Genius and an extenſive Knowledge. And then it is that thoſe Things, which *Philoſophy* ought to inſtruct us in, do as it were ſpontaneouſly offer to View. By this Means many *Notions*, which claim a Place in *Philoſophy*, have been handed down to us by Uſe,

Uſe, and will continue to be ſo handed to our lateſt Poſterity. In like Manner we learn, by a long and uninterrupted Courſe of *Experience*, the Things it is the Buſineſs of *Philoſophy* to inſtruct us in. And therefore we find much of the Spirit of *Philoſophers* in thoſe, who govern, tho' they diſclaim the Name: Thoſe who rule well, are therefore furniſhed with ſuch Notions as is the Province of *Philoſophy* to render diſtinct and evident, that their Uſe may become the more certain. And every one will readily allow that from *Notions* being made diſtinct and evident, there is alſo made a new Acceſſion of Strength to Civil Happineſs; nor will thoſe, who exert all their Care in Order to acquit themſelves well in the Buſineſs of ruling, deny the imperfect State of the *Art of reigning well*. The Deſiderata therefore *in this Art* are to be ſupplied by *Philoſophy*, but by the more genuin *Philoſophy*, which we profeſs, and which we ardently wiſh all may concur to promote. It were to be wiſh'd that a *Philoſopher* were furniſhed with the *Notions* of Men eminent in the Art of governing, and

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it is not to be doubted but he would with Intereſt repay what he had thus borrowed. There is much of the genuin *Philoſophy* to be met with in the common Affairs of Life, which is in vain to be ſought for in the Books of *Philoſophers*. If the Things relating to this Subject were collected, and by a *Philoſophical Head* reduced to *Syſtem*, we might then boaſt of a valuable Treaſure, which might be daily enriched with new Acceſſions of uſeful Knowledge.

FINIS.

An

An Abſtract drawn from the Abridgment of Wolfius's Philoſophy, *by Mr.* des Champs, *Chaplain to the King of* Pruſſia: *in* 2 *Volumes* 12*m°. printed at* Amſterdam, *Vol.* 1*ſt. in* 1743, *Vol.* 2*d.* ibid. 1747. *The firſt containing* Logick, Ontology, *and* Coſmology: *and the* 2*d. divided into* two Parts *containing* Experimental Pſychology, *and* Rational *or* Demonſtrative Pſychology.

THE *Philoſophy* of *Wolfius* makes ſo much Noiſe in *Germany*, and in the *North* as well as in *Italy* and *Switzerland*, that no Lover of the Sciences can be without ſome Curioſity to have at leaſt an Idea of it, and to know what it is that recommends it in ſo peculiar a Manner, and diſtinguiſhes it from all proceeding Syſtems. It is with a View of ſatisfying this Curioſity that our Author wrote the Book, of which we here give you an *Abſtract*. His Intention was to acquaint his Countrymen of *France*, with the Opinions of Mr. *Wolfius*, who wrote only in *German* or *Latin*, and that

that in a very prolix ſcientifick Method. This *Philoſopher* is a Diſciple of the famous *Leibnitz* whoſe principles he adopts in many Reſpects, and eſpecially in *Metaphyſicks*. *Wolfius* who is himſelf a great Mathematician has written a *Treatiſe on the Elements of the Mathematicks*, excellent in its kind and admir'd by all good Judges; and the *Royal Societies* of *London*, *Paris*, *Peterſburgh*, and *Berlin* have done him the Honour to aſſociate him to their illuſtrious Body's. *Wolfius* is at this Time *Profeſſor of Philoſophy and Right of Nations*, at *Halle* in *Saxony* in the King of *Pruſſia*'s Dominions, and *Chancellor* of that Univerſity. He firſt publiſh'd in *German* a Sketch of his Philoſophy in ſeveral Volumes in 8°. in order to ſound the Inclinations of the Publick; but ſoon after he publiſh'd again his Whole Syſtem itſelf in *Latin* in ſeveral Vols. in 4to. *Lutheran* Divines ſurpris'd at the Novelty of his Method and allarm'd at his great Reputation, rais'd againſt him a violent Perſecution, and caus'd him to be baniſh'd out of the States of the King of *Pruſſia*. *Wolfius*

ſius found Refuge at *Marburg* in the Principality of *Heſſe*, where he compos'd the greateſt Part of his Works, amidſt an incredible Number of Diſciples who flock'd to him thither from all Parts. There he remain'd till at laſt in the Year 1740. the preſent King of *Pruſſia* recall'd him into his Dominions, where he quietly enjoys his ſhining Reputation, and continues his Syſtem of *Philoſophy*, which he has already carried as far as the *twelfth Vol. in 4to.* and which will yet contain 3 or 4 more.

Mr. *des Champs* who ſtudied at *Marburg* under this great Man, publiſh'd in the Year 1736. a *French* Tranſlation of *Wolfius's Logick*, written by him in the *German* Tongue; which is eſteem'd the beſt that has hitherto appear'd. In 1740. the ſame Tranſlator publiſh'd a Volume of *Sermons* written in the Method of Mr. *Wolfius*, and which one may properly call *Wolfian Sermons*. Theſe *Sermons* are dedicated to the Queen of *Pruſſia* before whom Mr. *des Champs* had preach'd them. In 1743. he publiſh'd the *firſt Volume* of the Work that we are here endeavouring to give you an Idea of, and the *ſecond Volume* he has

lately publiſh'd in *Holland*.

The *firſt Volume* contains an Abridgment of the 3 firſt Vol's of *Wolfius*, which treat of *Logick*, *Ontology*, and *Coſmology*. The Author begins by a ſhort and curious Account of the *Diſcoveries* of *Leibnitz*, and *Wolfius*, and this Account is compriz'd in the 4 firſt Letters. The whole Work being written in Form of *Letters*, in order to render it more entertaining and fuller of Variety. He afterwards gives an Abſtract of *Wolfius Logick* in a very conciſe Manner, for it is all compris'd in 4 Letters. Having taken no Notice of any Thing but what is peculiar to his particular Syſtem. The firſt Thing obſervable is the new Form into which this *Philoſopher* has moulded it, by handling it in the *demonſtrative Mathematical Method*. Ev'ry Propoſition in it is accurately determin'd, and nothing advanc'd without Proof; 'tis all one Chain of Conſequences which, if I may ſo expreſs it, go hand in hand. The firſt Part of his *Logick* treats of the 3 Operations of the Mind; *Percieving*, *Judging*, and *Reaſoning*. The 2d Part is employed in ſhewing the *Uſe* of *Logick*, in diſtinguiſhing *Truth* from *Falſhood*,

hood, and *Certainty* from *Uncertainty*; the moſt curious Parts of it are the Articles touching the *Ideas*, *Evidence*, and the *Reading of the Holy Scriptures*.

As for *Ontology* it takes up here *ten Letters* which treat of the *Principle of Contradiction*, and that of the *Ratio Sufficiens*; of *Poſſibility* and *Impoſſibility*; of *Determinate* and *Indeterminate*; of the *Idea of Exiſtence*; of *Identity* and *Similitude*; of *Singular* and *Univerſal Exiſtence* or *Being*; of *Neceſſity* and *Contingency*; of *Quantity*; of *Quality*; of *Order*; of *Truth*; and of *Perfection*; of the *different Kinds of Beings*, and of their *reciprocal Relation*; of the *Eſſence of compound Beings*; of *Extenſion*; of *Continuity*; of *Space* and of *Time*; as alſo of the *Qualities* and *Quantity* of *compounded Beings*; of the *Modifications* of Things; of the *Modifications of ſimple Beings*; of *Finite* and *Infinite*; of the *reciprocal Relations* of *Beings*; of the *Dependency* and *Relation of Things*; of *Cauſes* and *Effects*. All theſe Articles are very curious from the Perſpicuity, the Exactitude, and Order obſerved throughout the Whole. It may be affirmed that it is

all new in Regard to the Manner in which it is handled, and the new Light in which the ingenious Author has ſet theſe Subjects ſo often handled before. Above all, the *two great Principles* on which the whole Syſtem of *Wolfius* is built, are worthy the Curioſity of the Reader, as well as the Articles concerning *Uncompounded* or *Simple Beings*, which is one of the greateſt Singularities of this new *Philoſophy*.

Coſmology is entirely the Invention of *Wolfius*, for Nobody had handled this Subject before himſelf; and he was the firſt that made it a Part of the *Metaphyſicks*. This *Coſmology* teaches how to apply to the World in general the abſtracted *Attributes of Being*, which are treated of in *Ontology*. It ſhews how the *Actuality* of *Contingent Beings* receives its *Determination* in the World, and in what Manner they are in a State of *Dependance* on a *Being* different from the World. It eſtabliſhes ſolidly the Idea which ought to be formed of *Body* in general. It ſeparates with great Nicety the true *Elements of Corporeal Things* from thoſe which are *imaginary*, thus baniſhing from *Phyſicks* all *Entia Rationis*, and manifeſting the

the true *Nature* of the *Univerſe*. It contains alſo the *Origin of Matter*, and of the *Vis Motrix*, out of the Boſom of their *Elements*; for out of the Elements are produc'd *primitive Corpuſcules*, from theſe Primitive the *Derivative*, from the *Derivative*, *Corpuſcles of different Kinds*, *Maſſes*, and *mixt Bodies*; from theſe *mixt Bodies* the Organs are fram'd, and laſtly out of theſe *Organs* are produc'd *Organiz'd Bodies*. There you will find the *ſpecifick Difference* of thoſe *Elements* from other *Simple Subſtances*; the *Laws of Motion*; the Idea of *Miracles* deduc'd with Exactneſs; and laſtly the Idea of the *World's Perfection*, and the *Order of Nature* plac'd in its fulleſt Light. The *Connection of Things*, or *Nexus Rerum* is there demonſtrated with Evidence; and that *Principle* of the celebrated *Leibnitz* appears here laid open and eſtabliſhed in a moſt convincing Manner. All *Germany* did in an eſpecial Manner applaud *Wolfius's Coſmology*, and it muſt be confeſſed that it is full of very important Diſcoveries. Mr. *des Champs* has given all the Subſtance of it in *ten Letters*, which compleat the *firſt Volume*.

The

The *2d Volume* which is but lately come out, is divided into two Books, one of which treats of *Experimental Pſychology*, the other of *Rational* or *Demonſtrative Pſychology*; that is to ſay, they contain a complete Treatiſe on the *Spirituality* and Immortality of the Soul, proved from *Reaſon* in a *philoſophical* Manner. *Wolfius* is alſo the firſt who has wrote a *Pneumatology*, or the Doctrine of the Soul, in a Method properly to be ſtil'd *demonſtrative*. He begins by examining all the *Faculties* of the Soul, and carefully remarks all that we can learn of it, from undoubted *Experience*; from thence it appears that there are in the Soul *two principal cognoſcitive Faculties*, which may be diſtinguiſhed into the *Inferior* and the *Superior Faculty*. To the *Inferior Faculty* belong the *Senſes*, *Imagination*, *Fiction*, *Memory*, *Forgetfulneſs*, and *Recollection*; but to the *Superior Faculty* we muſt refer *Attention*, *Reflexion*, *Underſtanding* and *Reaſon*. There is beſides obſervable in the Soul *two* other *Faculties* called *Appetitive*, again diſtinguiſhable into *Inferior* and *Superior*. The *firſt* comprehends *Pleaſure* and *Grief*, the *Idea* or *Apprehenſion of Good*

and

and Evil; *Senſitive Appetite*, and *Senſitive Averſion*, and the *Paſſions*; the *laſt* comprizes *Willing* and *Nilling*, as alſo *Liberty*. This is what *Wolfius* unfolds amply and eſtabliſhes with all poſſible Evidence and Certainty in his *Experimental Pſychology*. The Intent of *Rational Pſychology* is to give the *Reaſons* of all the *Operations* of the *Soul* before obſerv'd, from its very *Eſſence* and *Nature*. To this Purpoſe *Wolfius* applys himſelf *firſt* of all to diſcover this *Nature* and this *Eſſence*, and he determines it to conſiſt *in the Power of repreſenting to itſelf the World*. That being laid down he proceeds to apply this Idea to the *Cognoſcitive Inferior Faculty of the Soul*, then to its *Superior Cognoſcitive Faculty*, next to its *Inferior Appetitive Faculty*, and laſtly to its *Superior Appetitive Faculty*; and he explains moſt happily all the *Properties of the Soul* by that *Eſſence* or *Nature* which he attributes to it. From thence he paſſes on to the different *Hypotheſes* which have been deviced to give an Account of the *Union of the Body with the Soul*, and he prefers the *pre-eſtabliſhed Harmony*, (Harmonia Præſtabilita), to *phyſical Influences* and *Occaſional*

enal Cauſes; but not before he had weigh'd them all well. *Laſtly* he examines the various *Attributes of the Soul*, its *Spirituality*, its *Origin*, its *Union with the Body*, and its *Immortality*, which he *demonſtrates* in a convincing Manner. To conclude he enquires into the *Nature* of the *Souls of Beaſts*, and finds them to be *immaterial Beings* like our Souls, but endued only with their *Inferior Faculties*.

In the ſame Manner will *be abridg'd* the Sequel of *Wolfius's Syſtem*, which Mr. *des Champs* intends to compleat in Time. He is now at Work upon his *Theology of Nature*, after which will follow the *Law of Nations*, *Ethicks*, *Politicks*, and *Phyſicks* or *Natural Philoſophy*. *Wolfius* promiſes alſo the *Logick* of *Probables*, and the *Art of Invention*, which will be Works entirely new. But it is much to be fear'd that his advanced Age, (for he is now 71,) will deprive the Publick of theſe very curious Productions, and which he alone ſeems capable of executing. Upon the whole Mr. *des Champs Abridgment* is written with all poſſible Perſpicuity and Exactneſs, and illuſtrated with a great Deal of good Literature.

FINIS